\9fcl 


IC-NRLF 


3 

vp 


o 


o 


CHATTANOOGA 


AND 


CHICKAMAUG-A 


REPRINT  OF 


GEN.  H.  V.,BOYNTON'S  LETTERS 


TO  THE 


Cincinnati  Commercial  Gazette, 


AUGUST,  1888. 


Second  Edition,  with  Corrections. 


WASHINGTON.  D.  C.: 

GEO.  R.  GRAY,  PRINTER. 

1891. 


CHATTANOOGA 


AND 


CHICKAMAUG-A. 


REPRIXT   OF 


GEN.  H.  V.  BOYNTON'S  LETTERS 


TO  THE 


Cincinnati  Commercial  Gazette, 


AUGUST,  1888. 


Second  Edition,  with  Corrections. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C.: 
GEO.  R.  GRAY,  PRINTER. 

1891. 


PREFACE. 


Comrades  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  : 

When  General  H.  V.  Boynton's  letters  recently  appeared 
in  the  Cincinnati  Commercial  Gazette,  so  vividly  portraying 
the  achievements  and  heroism  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  in  its  campaign  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga,  in 
cluding  the  inevitable  incident  thereto,  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  I  thought  how  agreeable  it  would  be  for  each  member 
of  the  society  to  have  a  copy  for  perusal  at  our  approaching 
reunion  on  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  Chickamauga. 

Accordingly  I  asked  General  Boynton's  permission  to  print 
these  letters  in  pamphlet  form,  as  advance  sheets  of  any 
volume  in  which  he  may  determine  to  put  them  with  other 
matter.  To  this  he  most  cheerfully  assented  in  the  follow 
ing  letter : 

WASHINGTON,  Sept.  1,  1888. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  You  are  welcome  to  the  Chickamauga 
letters  for  any  use  you  choose  to  make  of  them.  While  the 
salient  features  of  both  days'  battle  are  easily  understood, 
the  details  of  movements  by  brigades  are  in  many  cases  in 
tricate.  For  this  reason  various  errors  may  have  been  made 
in  the  text.  If  those  who  observe  them  will  take  the  trouble 
to  correct  them  before  the  public,  they  would  thus  assist  in 
establishing  the  correct  history  of  a  battle  in  which  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  should  take  great  pride. 
Very  truly  yours, 

H.  Y.  BOYNTON. 

General  W.  S.  ROSECRANS. 

With  this  explanation,  the  letters  are  given  in  the  order 
of  their  respective  dates. 

W.  S.  ROSECRANS. 


M144778 


WASHINGTON,  August  3.  [Special.] — In  two  preliminary 
letters  about  Chicamauga  the  attempt  was  made  to  describe 
the  field  as  it  appears  to-day,  and  to  present  some  of  the 
scenes  of  the  battle  which  came  rushing  back  over  the  plains 
of  memory  with  a  power  suggestive  of  the  departed  legions 
that  once  clothed  these  farms,  forests,  and  ridges  with  the 
terrible  magnificence  of  battle. 

In  a  sense,  to  write  of  Ghicamauga  is  to  try  to  excite  in 
terest  in  a  subject  which  far  too  many  regard  as  worn  ;  but 
to  the  veterans  who  fought  there  it  will  never  be  a  thread 
bare  story.  For  that  generation  which  has  been  born  and 
has  come  to  manhood  since  Chattanooga  was  won  by  the 
Union  arms,  there  is  no  campaign  which  can  be  studied  with 
greater  profit,  or  which  will  more  richly  repay  the  reader. 
History  has  not  yet  done  justice  to  Chickamauga,  but  its  vor- 
dict  is  sure.  Many  of  the  misconceptions  of  the  days  follow 
ing  the  battle  still  exist  in  the  popular  mind.  It  may  be 
years  before  they  are  cleared  away  ;  but  eventually  the 
Chickamauga  campaign  will  stand  in  the  history  of  our  war 
as  unequaled  in  its  strategy  by  any  other  movement  of  the 
contest,  and  as  unsurpassed,  and  probably  not  equaled,  for 
the  stubbornness  and  deadliness  which  marked  the  splendid 
fighting  of  Unionist  and  rebel  alike  ;  and,  furthermore,  it 
will  stand  as  a  substantial  Union  victory. 

Just  in  proportion  as  the  credit  due  is  awarded  to  those 
who  planned  and  executed  the  campaign  will  well-merited 
condemnation  be  meted  out  to  those  at  Washington  who  in 
sisted  upon  forcing  the  movement  without  regard  to  proper 
and  vital  preparation,  who  withheld  re-enforcements,  and 
who,  in  spite  of  public  and  private  warnings  which  it  was 
criminal  not  to  heed,  made  rebel  concentrations  against  Rose- 
crans  possible  from  in  front  of  Washington  itself,  and  from 
Charleston,  Mobile,  and  Mississippi. 

It  will  be  the  purpose  of  a  few  letters  to  go  over  some  of 
the  well-known  ground  of  this  campaign  with  a  view  of 
enforcing  the  ideas  expressed  in  general  terms  above,  and 
attempting  to  present  a  clear  account  of  this  most  involved, 
and  still  seriously  misunderstood  battle.  The  strategy — 
matchless  in  our  war — which  compelled  Bragg  to  abandon 
Chattanooga  ;  the  life  and  death  struggle  for  concentrating 
the  Union  army  when  Rosecrans,  against  the  protests  of 
Washington  authorities  that  it  could  not  be  true,  found  his 
widely  separated  corps  confronted  with  re-enforcements  from 
every  part  of  the  Confederacy  ;  and,  lastly,  the  great  battle 
in  the  Chickamauga  forests  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga, 


are  each  most  fruitful  and  interesting  themes.  The  present 
letter  will  relate  to  the  first-named  subject,  the*strategy  of 
the  Chickamauga  campaign. 

Marching  from  Murfreesboro  on  the  23d  of  June,  1863, 
General  Rosecrans  had  advanced  against  Bragg,  who  was 
strongly  fortified,  and  whose  lines,  besides,  occupied  gaps 
and  ranges  of  great  natural  strength.  By  brilliant  strategy, 
with  the  loss  of  only  586  killed  and  wounded,  and  thirteen 
captured  or  missing,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  with  its 
nine  divisions  and  twenty  brigades,  operating  through  six 
teen  days  of  continuous  rain,  maneuvred  Bragg,  with  his 
seven  divisions  and  twenty-three  brigades,  out  of  his  natural 
and  artificial  strongholds,  and  forced  him  across  the  Tennes 
see.  Up  to  that  time  there  had  been  no  strategic  campaign 
to  equal  this,  and  it  was  soon  to  be  far  surpassed,  except  in 
the  one  element  of  loss,  by  the  campaign  to  follow  it.  So 
brilliant  had  been  the  conception  and  the  execution  that  all 
the  corps  commanders,  headed  by  General  Thomas,  hastened 
to  call  on  General  Rosecrans  and  offer  the  warmest  congratu 
lations. 

At  the  close  of  the  Tullahoma  campaign  Bragg  occupied 
Chattanooga  and  the  mountain  passes  above  and  below  it. 
Rosecrans's  army  lay  along  the  western  base  of  the  Cumber 
land  Mountains,  its  right  above  Winchester  and  its  left  at 
McMinnville.  Here  General  Rosecrans  at  once  began  the 
most  vigorous  preparations  for  another  campaign  for  the 
occupation  of  Chattanooga.  Because  the  necessities  of  the 
case  compelled  secrecy  as  one  of  the  main  elements  of  success, 
there  was  soon  at  Washington  a  manifestation  of  unreasoning 
impatience  over  what  was  criticized  as  the  inaction  of  the 
Union  commander  ;  but  those  who  were  on  the  ground  know 
well  the  unceasing  activity  and  energy  with  which  the  work 
progressed  of  accumulating  sufficient  supplies  of  food,  mate 
rial,  and  ammunition,  preparing  the  means  for  crossing  the 
Tennessee  and  obtaining  the  necessary  knowledge  of  the 
mountain  passes,  roads,  and  trails  by  which  the  army  must 
move.  Rosecrans's  supplies  reached  him  over  a  badly  equipped 
line  of  worn  railroad,  a  hundred  and  thirteen  miles  in  length, 
and,  as  can  be  readily  understood,  when  the  daily  wants  of 
a  great  army  preparing  for  extended  movement  and  battle 
are  considered,  the  matter  of  accumulating  a  surplus  of  sup 
plies  was  not  the  task  of  a  day  or  a  week.  With  every  effort 
the  railroad  was  not  repaired  until  July  25,  and  the  forward 
movement  began  on  the  14th  of  August. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  disclose  the  great  natural  obsta 
cles  which  lay  between  General  Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga. 
As  his  army  faced  toward  the  latter  point,  the  Cumberland 


Mountains,  with  a  general  elevation  of  2,200  feet,  rose  before 
it.  The  escarpment  was  everywhere  precipitous,  and  desti 
tute  of  every  means  of  approach  except  narrow  mountain 
roads  and  trails,  with  the  one  exception  that  a  short  railroad 
ran  from  Cowan  to  Tracy  City,  on  the  summit  of  the  range. 
To  the  eastward  this  range  dropped  by  like  precipitous  and 
difficult  slopes  into  the  valley  of  the  Sequatchee  River.  Be 
yond  that  stream  rose  the  equally  sharp  cliffs  of  Walden's 
Ridge,  with  a  general  elevation  of  1,300  feet.  This  fell  off 
along  the  eastern  and  southern  edge  of  the  plateau  into  the 
valley  of  the  Tennessee,  and  overlooked  it  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Sequatchee  River  to  a  point  far  above  Chattanooga. 
It  was  fifty  miles  as  the  crow  flies  from  the  lines  of  Rose- 
crans's  army  across  this  continuous  mountain  region  to  the 
valley  of  the  Tennessee.  This  river  was  broad  and  deep, 
and  presented  in  itself  the  most  serious  natural  obstacle 
which  the  Union  army  had  encountered  since  it  left  the  Ohio 
River.  It  was  2,700  feet  wide  at  Bridgeport,  and  1,254  feet 
at  Caperton,  the  points  where  the  bridges  were  subsequently 
thrown. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  the  stronghold  of  Chatta 
nooga  lying  behind  the  river,  and  the  great  ranges  to  the 
westward  between  Rosecrans's  position  and  his  own,  might 
well  seem  to  Bragg  impregnable,  in  fact  almost  unassailable. 
First,  toward  the  west,  came  the  Lookout  range,  rising 
abruptly  from  the  river  to  the  height  of  2,200  feet,  and 
stretching  south westwardly  far  into  Georgia  and  Alabama. 
Its  western  piecipices  looked  down  into  the  narrow  valley  of 
Lookout  Creek.  Beyond  the  latter  rose  the  equally  precipi 
tous  cliffs  of  the  Raccoon  Mountains,  the  latter  having  the 
same  general  elevation  as  the  Lookout  range. 

The  gorge  of  the  Tennessee  where  it  breaks  through  these 
mountain  ranges  is  so  narrow  and  so  thoroughly  commanded 
from  the  heights  on  both  sides  as  to  render  it  impracticable 
to  so  move  an  army  as  to  attack  it  from  the  front  or  river 
side. 

With  these  giant  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  his  columns, 
most  serious  even  if  they  had  been  within  the  Union  lines, 
but  almost  insuperable  when  found  in  an  enemy's  territory, 
and  while  he  was  bending  every  energy  to  complete  prepara 
tions  for  carrying  out  a  brilliant  plan  of  his  own  for  over 
coming  them,  General  Rosecrans  was  astonished  at  receiving 
on  August  4,  only  ten  days  after  his  railroad  had  been  re 
paired  to  the  Tennessee  River,  a  dispatch  from  Halleck  say 
ing  :  "  Your  forces  must  move  forward  without  delay.  You 
will  daily  report  the  movement  of  each  corps  till  you  cross 
the  Tennessee  River." 


8 

To  a  commander  who  was  building  boats,  opening  mount 
ain  roads,  rushing  the  accumulation  of  stores,  getting  out 
material  for  four  thousand  feet  of  bridges,  preparing  to  leave 
his  base  carrying  provisions  for  twenty-five  days,  and  am 
munition  for  two  battles,  and  crossing  three  mountain  ranges 
and  a  deep  and  broad  river,  in  an  enemy's  country,  and  in 
the  face  of  an  army,  this  dispatch  was  not  only  astounding, 
but  discouraging  and  exasperating  to  the  last  degree. 

It  had  become  a  habit  at  Washington  to  sneer  at  the  slow 
ness  of  General  Kosecrans,  as  it  was  later  to  denounce  Gen 
eral  Thomas  in  similar  terms  at  Nashville.  There  was  no 
more  reason  or  justice  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other.  The 
verdict  of  history  has  been  reached  in  the  case  of  General 
Thomas.  It  is  sure  to  come,  and  to  be  the  same  in  this  mat 
ter,  for  Kosecrans. 

To  this  dispatch,  which  can  only  be  excused  on  the  ground 
of  wholly  inexcusable  ignorance  of  the  active  preparations 
in  progress  and  the  natural  difficulties  of  an  advance,  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  replied  with  his  accustomed  clearness  and 
spirit:  "Your  dispatch  ordering  me  to  move  forward  with 
out  delay,  reporting  the  movements  of  each  corps  till  I  cross 
the  Tennessee,  is  received.  As  I  have  determined  to  cross 
the  river  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  have  been  making  all 
preparations  and  getting  such  information  as  may  enable  me 
to  do  so  without  being  driven  back,  like  Hooker,  I  wish  to 
know  if  your  order  is  intended  to  take  away  my  discretion 
as  to  the  time  and  manner  of  moving  my  troops."  To  this 
Halleck  responded  :  u  The  orders  for  the  advance  of  your 
army,  and  that  it  be  reported  daily,  are  peremptory."  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  immediately  wrote  the  following  reply,  and, 
calling  his  corps  commanders  together,  read  the  dispatches 
given  above.  There  was  no  dissent  from  the  proposition  that 
at  that  stage  of  their  preparations  it  was  impossible  to  move. 
He  then  read  his  reply  as  follows,  and  all  approved  arid 
agreed  that  they  should  support  him  : 

"  GENERAL  HALLECK  :%  My  arrangements  for  beginning  a 
continuous  movement  will  be  completed  and  the  execution 
begun  Monday  next.  We  have  information  to  show  that 
crossing  the  Tennessee  between  Bridgeport  and  Chattanooga 
is  impracticable,  but  not  enough  to  show  whether  we  had 
better  cross  above  Chattanooga  and  strike  Cleveland,  or  below 
Bridgeport  and  strike  in  their  rear.  The  preliminary  move 
ment  of  troops  for  the  two  cases  are  very  different.  It  is  nec 
essary  to  have  our  means  of  crossing  the  river  completed,  and 
our  supplies  provided  to  cross  sixty  miles  of  mountains  and 
sustain  ourselves  during  the  operations  of  crossing  and  fight 
ing,  before  we  move.  To  obey  your  order  literally  would 


9 

be  to  push  our  troops  into  the  mountains  on  narrow  and  diffi 
cult  roads,  destitute  of  pasture  and  forage,  and  short  of  water, 
where  they  would  not  be  able  to  maneuver  as  exigencies  may 
demand,  and  would  certainly  cause  ultimate  delay  and  prob 
able  disaster.  If,  therefore,  the  movement  which  I  propose 
cannot  be  regarded  as  obedience  to  your  order,  I  respectfully 
request  a  modification  of  it  or  to  be  relieved  from  the  com 
mand." 

On  the  following  day  Halleck  replied  as  follows : 

"I  have  communicated  to  you  the  wishes  of  the  Govern 
ment  in  plain  and  unequivocal  terms.  The  objective  has  been 
stated,  and  you  have  been  directed  to  lose  no  time  in  reach 
ing  it.  The  means  you  are  to  employ  and  the  roads  you  are 
to  follow  are  left  to  your  own  discretion.  If  you  wish  to 
promptly  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  Government  you  will 
not  stop  to  discuss  mere  details.  In  such  matters  I  do  not 
interfere." 

This  was  answered  the  same  day  by  General  Rosecrans  as 
follows  : 

u  Your  dispatch  received.  I  can  only  repeat  the  assurance 
given  before  the  issuance  of  the  order.  This  army  shall  move 
with  all  dispatch  compatible  with  the  successful  execution  of 
our  work.  We  are  pressing  everything  to  bring  up  forage 
for  our  animals.  The  present  rolling-stock  of  the  road  will 
barely  suffice  to  keep  us  day  by  day  here,  but  I  have  bought 
fifty  more  freight  cars,  which  are  arriving.  Will  advise  you 
daily/' 

This  was  the  last  of  interference  from  Washington,  but, 
accustomed  as  all  there  were  to  interfering  at  will,  and  direct 
ing  affairs  according  to  the  situation  as  they  saw  it,  they 
could  not  brook  such  manifestly  proper  independence  as  was 
shown  by  Rosecrans,  and  from  that  time  forward  there  was 
needed  only  an  excuse  to  insure  his  removal. 

Had  there  been  a  tithe  of  the  attention  given  to  preventing 
the  rebels  from  concentrating  on  his  front  from  every  part  of 
the  Confederacy — in  fact,  bringing  Longstreet's  veterans 
from  the  lines  under  Halleck 's  own  eyes — that  there  was  to 
the  kind  ot'  interference  which  has  been  noticed,  Bragg  would 
have  been  destroyed  in  front  of  Chattanooga.  But  this  sub 
ject  properly  belongs  in  a  succeeding  letter.  The  dispatches 
given  above  are  well  known,  but  their  reproduction  will 
prove  a  convenience  to  readers  who  may  not  carry  their  ex 
act  terms  in  mind. 

Ten  clays  later,  namely,  on  August  14,  the  movement  to 
secure  Chattanooga  began.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  reveal 
its  strategy. 


10 

Rosecrans  had  decided  to  cross  the  Tennessee  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  Bridgeport,  and  subsequently  the  Raccoon  and  Lookout 
Mountain  ranges  at  points  south  of  Chattanooga,  and  thus 
compel  Bragg  to  evacuate  the  place  or  to  come  out  of  it  and 
fight  for  his  line  of  communications.  It  is  easily  seen  that 
if  after  crossing  the  river  the  enemy,  warned  in  time,  should 
be  found  in  force  on  the  western  slopes  of  these  ranges  fur 
ther  progress  in  that  direction  would  have  been  impossible, 
and  a  return  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river  obligatory.  It 
was,  therefore,  necessary  to  wholly  deceive  Bragg  as  to  the 
points  of  crossing. 

Burnside  was  marching  from  Kentucky  into  East  Tennes 
see.  Any  apparent  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  in  force  in  that  direction  would  naturally  lead  Bragg  to 
believe  that  a  junction  of  the  Union  forces  was  contemplated 
on  his  right. 

Everything  being  ready,  Crittenden  opened  the  campaign 
with  the  Twenty-first  Corps.  Leaving  his  camps  at  Hills- 
boro',  Manchester,  and  McMinnville  on  the  16th  of  August, 
he  crossed  the  Cumberland  Mountains  and  occupied  the 
Sequacliee  Valley  from  a  point  between  Jasper  and  Dunlap 
to  Pik«'ville.  Van  Cleve  held  the  latter  place,  Palmer  was 
established  at  Dunlap,  and  Wood  at  Anderson,  between 
Dunlap  and  Jasper.  All  built  extensive  camp  fires  and 
moved  about  in  such  ways  as  to  convey  to  observers  from  the 
heights  the  impression  that  the  whole  army  was  moving. 
Meantime  Minty's  active  cavalry  had  moved  through  Sparta 
and  driven  Dibrell's  cavalry  eastward  through  Crossville,  on 
to  the  Tennessee,  and  over  it,  and  Dibrell,  having  come  to 
reconnoiter  and  see  what  was  going  on,  naturally  got  the  idea 
that  Rosecrans's  army  was  coming.  The  crossing  of  the 
Cumberland  was  but  the  first  step  of  the  imposing  diversion. 
Though  the  mountain  roads  were  few  and  very  difficult, 
Crittenden's  movements  over  them  had  been  completed  ex 
actly  on  time.  The  advance  over  Walden's  Ridge,  equally 
difficult,  though  it  was  not  quite  as  high  as  the  main  range, 
was  immediately  undertaken.  Minty,  on  the  extreme  left, 
appeared  on  the  Tennessee  more  than  thirty  miles  above 
Blythe's  Ferry,  where  he  made  most  energetic  commotion. 
Hazen  reached  the  river  in  the  vicinity  of  Dallas.  Two 
brigades  were  strung  out  along  the  edge  of  the  cliffs  on  the 
top  of  Walden's  Ridge,  where  they  overlooked  Blythe's  Ferry, 
and  could  be  seen  from  the  other  side  of  the  river.  Minty 
with  his  troopers,  swept  down  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee  to 
near  Chattanooga*  Wilder  and  Wagner  also  appeared  in  the 
valley.  While  a  show  of  building  boats  was  made  in  the 
small  streams  about  Blythe's  Ferry,  Wilder  from  the  heights 


11 

of  Waldcn's  Ridge,  opposite  Chattanooga,  opened  fire  on  the 
town  with  artillery.  Bragg  was  thoroughly  deceived.  For 
rest  was  ordered  far  up  the  Tennessee  to  Kingston  to  watch 
for  the  expected  crossing.  Buckner  was  ordered  from  East 
Tennessee  toward  Blythe's  Ferry. 

As  may  be  supposed,  Wilder's  cannonading  produced  the 
wildest  excitement  in  Chattanooga.  The  rollipg-stock  of 
the  railroads  was  hastened  out  of  reach.  The  depots  of  sup 
plies  were  moved  out  of  the  range  of  the  unexpected  bom 
bardment.  D.  H.  Hill's  corps  was  hurried  oft'  to  guard  the 
river  above,  and  other  heavy  forces  were  moved  in  the  same 
direction.  Everything  done  by  Bragg  was  based  upon  the 
idea  that  Rosecrans  was  moving  in  iorce  to  points  on  the 
river  above  the  city. 

Meantime  the  real  movement  was  going  on  quietly  sixty 
to  eighty  miles  in  the  opposite  direction,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Bridgeport  and  IStevenson.  A  force  of  cavalry  for  the  pur 
poses  of  observation,  and  to  convey  ihe  idea  by  quick  move 
ments  that  Rosecrans  was  feigning  below,  while  really  ex 
pecting  to  cross  above  the  city,  was  sent  as  far  westward  as 
Decatur.  Thus  Rosecrans  was  operating  along  the  river 
through  a  bin  dred  miles  of  mountain  region  and  fifty  miles 
of  low  country  beyond,  and  in  spite  of  the  natural  difficul 
ties  every  part  of  the  plan  was  working  with  precision. 

Thomas  and  McCook  on  the  right  moved  at  the  same  time 
with*  Crittenden.  Reynolds,  of  Thomas's  corps,  had  marched 
in  advance  and  repaired  the  roads  by  way  of  University,  and 
down  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain  to  Jasper.  Brannan 
iollowed  him,  and  both  were  at  first  kept  well  out  of  sight 
of  the  river.  Baird  and  Negley  came  down  nearer  to  Bridge 
port,  and  McCook  descended  back  of  Stevenson.  With  the 
exception  of  Sheridan,  at  Bridgeport,  all  were  kept  well  out 
of  sight  from  the  enemy's  cavaliy  on  the  left  bank. 

Sheridan  alone  made  a  show  of  his  presence  arid  openly 
began  the  construction  of  a  trestle  through  the  shoal  water, 
in  order  to  lessen  the  length  of  the  floating  bridge.  As 
this  was  without  a  decided  show  of  strength  it  deepened 
the  impression  that  the  movements  on  this  wing  were  the 
feint  and  those  toward  the  upper  river  the  real  move.  In 
fact,  after  watching  Sheridan's  trestle  building  for  a  while 
from  the  other  side  of  the  river,  Anderson's  brigade  of 
infantry,  the  only  infantry  force  available  to  oppose 
a  passage  of  the  river,  was  withdrawn  and  sent  to  Chatta 
nooga. 

The  bridge  for  Caperton's  Ferry  was  brought  down  on  a 
train,  which  was  halted  out  of  sight,  and  a  road  cut  for  its 
transportation  through  the  woods  to  a  point  near  its  desti- 


12 

nation,  where  the  troops  which  were  to  lay  it  were  drilled  in 
their  work. 

Early  on  the  29th  fifty  boats,  each  carrying  fifty  men, 
were  brought  out  of  the  woods  near  Caperton's,  rushed 
across  an  open  field,  launched,  and  quickly  rowed  to  the  op 
posite  shore.  The  Confederate  cavalry  pickets  were  driven 
off  and  twenty-five  hundred  men  held  the  south  bank.  The 
bridge  was  promptly  laid.  Davis  was  soon  over,  and  then 
McCook's  entire  corps,  with  cavalry,  started  promptly  for 
Valley  Head,  forty  miles  down  the  Lookout  range.  Rey 
nolds  collected  boats  at  Shellmonnd,  Brannan  had  built 
rafts  and  cut  out  canoes  at  the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek.  The 
long  bridge  was  successfully  laid  at  Bridgeport,  and  before 
Bragg  had  recovered  from  his  surprise,  in  fact  before  he  had 
comprehended  the  extent  of  the  movement,  Rosecrans,  with 
two  corps,  was  over  the  river  and  moving  on  his  communi 
cations. 

As  soon  as  the  crossing  was  assured,  Crittenden  marched 
with  celerity  by  way  of  the  Sequatchee  Valley  towards  the 
bridges  and  was  soon  across  with  the  main  body  and  advanc 
ing  on  the  left  of  it  directly  towards  Chattanooga. 

This  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  was  a  great  feat.  The 
bridges  were  not  sufficient  for  the  army.  Reynolds  gathered 
small  boats  and  improvised  his  own  means  of  crossing.  Bran- 
nan's  men  had  cut  out  canoes  from  immense  poplars  and 
launched  them  in  Battle  Creek  out  of  sight.  Some  of -them 
would  hold  fifty  men.  They  also  built  rafts,  one  of  them 
large  enough  to  carry  artillery.  These,  with  an  abandoned 
rebel  pontoon  boat,  constituted  Brannan's  flotilla.  When 
the  signal  was  given  the  whole  swept  out  from  behind  the 
bushes  which  concealed  the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek  and  made 
for  the  opposite  shore.  The  rebel  pickets  withdrew  and  the 
crossing  was  secured.  Then  all  his  men  who  could  swim, 
piling  their  guns,  clothing,  and  accouterments  on  a  few  fence 
rails,  pushed  these  before  them  and  thus  gained  the  opposite 
bank.  Later,  Wilder  swan  his  mounted  brigade  across  the 
river  and  joined  Crittenden  south  of  Chattanooga.  Halleck 
must  have  had  this  ability  for  crossing  a  river  in  the  pres 
ence  of  an  enemy  in  mind  when  he  telegraphed  Rosecrans,  a 
few  weeks  before,  to  move  at  once  and  keep  moving. 

But  this  crossing,  and  the  grand  diversion  which  made  it 
possible,  were  only  the  preliminary,  and  by  no  means  the 
formidable  parts  of  the  movement.  To  complete  it,  Rose 
crans  was  to  cut  loose  from  his  base,  carry  twenty-five 
day's  supplies  and  sufficient  ammunition  for  two  battles, 
cross  two  precipitous  and  difficult  mountain  ranges  wholly 
within  the  enemy's  territory,  and  their  passes  presumably 


13 

strengthened  and  defended,  and,  after  crossing  the  last  range 
at  widely  separated  points,  to  descend  into  the  valley  in  the 
rear  of  that  enemy's  stronghold,  prepared  for  battle  or  any 
other  contingencies  which  might  arise  on  this  distant  and 
isolated  theater  of  action. 

When  Bragg  discovered  the  real  point  of  crossing  and  the 
lines  of  actual  movement  it  was  too  late  to  recall  the  forces 
dispatched  up  the  Tennessee  or  to  post  columns  of  sufficient 
strength  on  the  slopes  before  Rosecrans  to  impede  his  ad 
vance  in  force.  How  strong  the  positions  thus  turned  by 
the  Union  forces  were  will  appear  from  the  statement  that 
so  precipitious  and  otherwise  difficult  were  the  roads  over 
these  ranges  that  at  several  of  them  it  required  a  day  and  a 
night  for  a  division  with  its  artillery  and  reduced  trains  to 
make  the  ascent. 

The  Union  commander  had  delayed  his  movement  until 
the  corn  was  ripe  in  order  that  it  might  not  be  necessary  to 
carry  grain  for  his  animals,  which  would  have  largely  in 
creased  his  trains — so  careful,  thoughtful,  and  wise  was  he  in 
every  detail  of  preparation. 

Bragg's  failure  to  resit  in  the  vicinity  of  Rosecrans's  cross 
ings  and  at  the  crossings  bf  Raccoon  Mountains  was  due  in 
part  to  the  tact  that  even  after  he  knew  that  the  heads  of 
columns  were  over  the  river  he  was  still  inclined  to  look 
upon  their  movements  as  a  feint,  and  to  regard  the  real  point 
of  danger  to  lie  above  the  city.  Rosecrans,  even  after  cross 
ing,  sought  successfully  to  strengthen  such  impressions  in 
Bragg's  mind.  He  directed  Wagner's,  Wilder's,  and  Minty's 
brigades  to  report  to  Hazeri,  and  with  this  force,  some  7,000 
strong,  the  latter  was  ordered  to  make  a  conspicuous  show 
of  crossing  the  river  far  above  Chattanooga.  This  active  and 
efficient  officer  admirably  executed  his  orders.  By  extended 
fires,  by  marchings  and  countermarchings,  by  moving  his 
artillery  continuously  across  openings  in  sight  from  the  oppo 
site  bank,  by  buglers  at  widely  separated  points,  and  other 
similiar  devices,  he  easily  created  the  belief  that  an  army  was 
encamped  on  the  right  bank  intending  to  cross. 

With  the  exception  of  this  force,  all  of  Rosecrans's  army 
was  south  of  the  river  on  September  4,  and  on  the  move. 
The  right  was  already  well  on  its  way.  On  the  6th  his  army 
had  descended  from  Raccoon  Mountain  and  occupied  the 
valley  between  that  range  and  the  western  slope  of  Lookoot 
from  a  point  seven  miles  from  Chattanooga  to  Valley  Head, 
forty-two  miles  from  the  city.  The  next  day  McCook  arid 
Thomas  began  to  ascend  Lookout  at  points  respectively  forty- 
two  and  twenty-six  miles  from  Chattanooga.  On  the  8th 
McCook's  troops  were  in  motion  down  the  eastern  slope  of 


14 

the  mountain  toward  Alpine,  and  Thomas  was  descending 
from  Steven's  and  Frick's  Gap,  both  of  which  were  near 
where  the  road  from  Trenton,  after  running  southwardly,  is 
represented  as  leading  over  Lookout.  Crittenden  had  pushed 
small  portions  of  his  command  up  mere  mountain  trails,  and 
on  the  9th  these  gained  position  where  they  could  look  down 
upon  Chattanooga.  They  saw  no  flags,  and  soon  discovered 
that  Bragg  had  evacuated.  The  day  before  Wagner,  still 
watching  from  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  had  reported  to 
Rosecrans  that  the  enemy  was  leaving.  The  news  came  in 
the  night,  and  Rosecrans  ordered  Crittenden  to  ascertain  the 
situation.  His  detachments  on  the  mountain  had  already 
discovered  that  the  city  was  deserted.  Crittenden  was  at 
once  ordered  to  march  around  the  north  point  of  Lookout, 
and  follow  Bragg  toward  Ringgold.  At  night  on  the  9th 
Palmer  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions  were  established  at  Ross- 
ville,  five  miles  south  of  Chattanooga. 

Thus,  in  three  weeks  from  the  time  his  diversion  towards 
Bragg's  right  began,  and  in  five  days  from  the  time  his  army 
was  over  the  river,  Rosecrans  had  repeated  the  Tullahoma 
campaign  on  a  far  greater  scale,  and  in  the  face  of  much 
more  formidable  obstacles,  and  absolutely  without  fighting, 
except  as  Minty  had  been  slightly  engaged  with  Dibrell  near 
Sparta  in  the  outset  of  the  movement,  had  driven  Bragg  from 
the  mountain  stronghold  of  Chattanooga,  the  objective  of 
the  campaign.  It  was  well  said  later  by  General  Meigs,  who 
came  from  Washington  to  Chattanooga  after  its  final  occupa 
tion  by  the  Union  army,  and  spent  some  days  in  studying 
the  movements  by  which  it  had  been  secured  :  "It  is  not 
only  the  greatest  operation  in  our  war,  but  a  great  thing 
when  compared  with  any  war." 

But  the  occupation  of  Chattanooga,  in  a  military  sense, 
was  not  accomplished  by  sending  Crittenden's  two  divisions 
beyond  it  and  one  brigade  into  it.  Bragg  had  only  with 
drawn  to  save  his  communications  and  supplies,  and  to  await 
the  re-enforcements  he  knew  to  be  hastening  from  Virginia, 
from  Mobile,  and  from  Mississippi.  The  battle  for  Chatta 
nooga  was  yet  to  be  fought.  Bragg  had  retired  with  delib 
eration  .  He  established  his  headquarters  at  Lafayette,  behind 
Pigeon  Mountains,  but  his  rear  guard  never  passed  beyond 
Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills. 

The  news  that  Rosecrans'  troops  were  in  Chattanooga,  and 
that  he  had  pushed  out  after  the  retreating  Bragg,  made  a 
tremendous  impression  upon  the  North.  It  was  accepted  as 
a  capture,  and  a  military  occupation  of  that  long-coveted 
stronghold.  It  is  true  it  was  occupied,  but  not  in  a  military 
sense,  since  the  Union  army  had  not  been  brought  into  it, 
or  concentrated  between  it  and  the  enemy. 


15 

Hence  arose  that  misconception,  which  is  widespread  still, 
that  the  Array  of  the  Curaherland  had  occupied  Chattanooga, 
and  thence  marching  out  to  attack  Bragg,  had  been  defeated 
by  the  latter  at  Chickamauga,  and  driven  back  in  disorder 
into  Chattanooga. 

But,  instead,  Chickamauga  was  the  battle  for  Chattanooga, 
fought  by  Rosecrans  while  on  the  way  to  take  military  pos 
session  of  it,  and  while  he  was  concentrating  his  army  be 
tween  Bragg  and  that  city,  the  objective  of  the  Union  cam 
paign.  The  battle  was  not  for  the  Chickamauga  woods,  but 
for  the  passes  behind  them  which  controlled  the  way  to  Chat 
tanooga.  These  were  secured  as  the  immediate  result  of  the 
battle,  and  the  successful  occupation  of  Chattanooga  in  the 
military  sense  followed — an  occupation  which  lasted  till  the 
close  of  the  war. 

In  connection  with  the  fact  of  Crittenden's  unopposed 
movement  into  Chattanooga  another  point  of  general  misap 
prehension  arose,  which,  through  the  years,  has  formed  the 
basis  of  unfair  and  unthinking,  if  not  ignorant  criticism  of 
General  Rosecrans'  brilliant  strategy.  Why  did  not  Rose- 
crans  face  Thomas  and  McCook  about  in  the  valley  west  of 
Lookout,  where  their  movements  would  have  been  concealed, 
and  hurry  them  after  Crittenden  into  Chattanooga?  It  was 
simply  because  with  McCook's  advance  nearly  fifty  miles 
from  Chattanooga  by  the  roads  west  of  Lookout,  and  Thomas's 
head  of  column  already  down  and  over  Missionary  Ridge, 
full  thirty  miles  away,  to  withdraw  and  send  them  in  succes 
sion  after  Crittenden  *vould  have  been  to  have  invited  attack 
in  detail  from  Bragg  upon  each  head  of  column  as  it  followed 
Crittenden,  with  all  the  chances  in  favor  of  Bragg's  success. 
Besides,  the  shortest  and  surest,  in  fact  the  only  practicable 
line  of  concentration  looking  to  the  safety  of  the  widely- 
separated  corps  was  through  a  movement  to  the  left  along 
the  eastern  basis  of  Lookout  and  Missionary  Ridge.  It  was 
this  movement  of  Rosecrans  for  concentrating  on  Crittenden's 
position  south  of  Rossville  that  led  to  the  battle  of  Chicka 
mauga.  Bragg,  having  been  heavily  re-enforced,  started  at 
the  same  time  from  Lafayette  to  interpose  between  Rosecrans 
and  Chattanooga,  the  Union  objective  of  the  whole  campaign. 

Subsequent  letters  will  follow  this  exciting  concentration, 
and  the  desperate  contests  of  each  army  for  position,  and 
the  bloody  battles  which  ensued,  and  by  which  Chattanooga 
was  finally  won. 

H.  V.  B. 


WASHINGTON,  August  7. — [Special.] — In  the  movements  of 
the  Union  armies  none,  from  first  to  last,  presented  such 
brilliant  strategy  as  the  two  which  brought  General  Rosecrans 
from  Murfreesboro',  to  the  rear  of  Chattanooga.  Almost 
equally  wonderful  was  the  successful  concentration  of  his 
widely  scattered  corps.  This  was  accomplished  in  the  face 
of  an  enemy  that  had  been  heavily  re-enforced  with  veteran 
troops,  and  largely  outnumbered  General  Rosecrans.  The 
concentration,  moreover,  united  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  for  battle  between  this  confident  enemy  and  the  city 
which  was  the  objective  of  the  Union  forces. 

The  story  is  crowded  with  brilliant  and  successful  opera 
tions  of  detached  corps  against  greatly  superior  forces  and  of 
minor  strategy,  which  blend  harmoniously  with  the  more 
striking  features  of  the  great  campaign.  It  covers  a  period 
of  intense  anxiety  for  General  Rosecrans  and  his  subordinate 
commanders,  of  most  skillful  action,  and  continued  danger  to 
destruction  in  detail.  It  culimnated  in  the  delivery  of  a  bat 
tle,  which,  through  still  widely  misunderstood,  unquestiona 
bly  ranks  for  the  stubbornness  and  effectiveness  of  its  fighting 
and  the  importance  of  its  results  with  the  most  notable  bat 
tles  of  the  war. 

A  previous  letter  left  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  where 
its  strategy  had  thrown  it  across  three  mountain  ranges  and 
the  Tennessee  River,  and  brought  it  without  loss  to  the  rear 
of  Chattanooga,  at  the  foot  of  the  eastern  base  of  the  Lookout 
Mountains.  This  had  compelled  Bragg  to  withdraw  toward 
Lafayette.  The  left  of  the  Union  army,  under  General  Crit- 
tenden,  had  passed  around  the  north  end  of  Lookout,  marched 
through  Chattanooga  after  Bragg,  and  occupied  Rossville 
Gap.  General  McCook,  forty-two  miles  to  the  right,  had 
descended  to  Alpine,  while  the  center,  under  General 
Thomas,  was  at  Steven's  Gap,  directly  opposite  Bragg's 
center,  at  Lafayette. 

Finding  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  behind  Pigeon 
Mountains,  General  Rosecrans  having  been  assured  from 
Washington  that  no  re-enforcements  had  been  sent  from  Lee's 
army,  determined  to  push  Bragg  vigorously  at  all  points  for 
the  purpose  of  gaining  every  advantage  which  a  retreat  pre 
sented,  and  of  inflicting  all  the  damage  possible.  Beyond 
question,  this  put  his  army  in  serious  peril,  since  Bragg  had 
only  retired  to  meet  re-enforcements  promised  and  actually 
arriving  from  all  quarters,  and  was  even  then  concentrated 
and  ready  to  strike.  McCook,  on  the  right,  pushed  in  from 
Alpine  and  Summerville  with  Stanley's  cavalry  to  within 


16a 


17 

seven  miles  of  Lafayette  without  finding  any  signs  of  retreat. 
He  therefore  wisely  kept  his  trains  and  main  force  near  the 
mountain. 

Negley,  of  Thomas,  marched  out  from  Steven's  Gap  beyond 
the  Chickamauga  and  his  skirmishers  deployed  in  front  of 
Dug  Gap.  This  advanced  position  he  held  during  the  10th, 
and  early  next  morning  was  supported  in  it  by  Baird's  di 
vision.  Here  Bragg  attempted  his  initiative,  and  developed 
his  preparations  for  advance.  Two  corps  of  infantry,  Hill's 
and  Walker's,  a  division  from  Folk's  command,  and  a  di 
vision  of  cavalry,  were  in  the  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mountains,  or  the 
woods  behind  them,  under  orders  to  advance  on  Negley.  By 
a  fortanate  delay  their  combinations  for  attack  were  not  com 
pleted  until  Baird  had  arrived.  The  bold  front  displayed  by 
both  of  these  officers  still  further  held  back  those  overwhelm 
ing  forces  of  Bragg.  When  the  latter  were  ready  to  move, 
the  skill,  sharp  fighting,  and  able  maneuvering  under  fire 
enabled  these  Union  officers  to  bring  their  troops  back  to  the 
shelter  of  the  mountain  with  comparatively  little  loss.  It 
was  a  thrilling  and  difficult  situation,  and  the  day  a  most 
anxious  one  for  Generals  Rosecrans  and  Thomas. 

The  disappointment  was  great  to  Bragg  when  he  learned 
that  his  heavy  converging  columns  from  Catlett's  Gap  on  his 
right,  Dug  Gap  in  the  center,  and  Blue  Bird  Gap  on  his  left 
had  met  on  the  ground  held  by  Negley  and  Baird,  only  to  find 
them  retiring  with  such  show  of  strength  and  with  such  well 
ordered  lines  as  enabled  them  to  elude  even  serious  attack. 
Both  these  officers  deserve  far  greater  credit  than  they  have 
ever  received  for  their  courage,  coolness,  and  ability.  At 
night  they  were  supported  by  the  arrival  of  Brannan  and 
Reynolds  from  the  west  side  of  the  mountain,  and  the  position 
of  Thomas  at  Steven's  Gap  was  secure. 

Rosecran's  anxiety  and  Bragg's  attention  were  instantly 
turned  to  the  Union  left.  The  discovery  on  the  1 1th  that  the 
rebel  rear  guard  under  Cheatham  had  not  moved  south  of 
Lee  &  Gordon's  showed  Rosecrans  that  whatever  Bragg' s 
intention  may  have  been,  he  was  then  concentrating  for  battle. 
As  General  Rosecrans  himself  declares  in  his  official  report, 
the  concentration  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  became  a 
matter  of  life  and  death. 

Crittenden,  from  the  9th  to  the  12th,  had  carried  on  most 
vigorous  operations.  Palmer  and  Van  Cleve  had  advanced 
to  Ringgold.  Wood  was  close  at  hand.  Hazen,  Minty,  and 
Wilder,  fresh  from  their  part  in  the  brilliant  feint  north  of 
the  river,  had  joined  Crittenden,  and  some  lively  minor  bat 
tles  were  the  result.  The  discovery  that  the  rebel  rear  guard 
was  still  at  Lee  &  Gordon's  suddenly  stopped  these  opera- 


18 

tions,  and  on  the  12th,  under  an  order  to  concentrate  with 
the  utmost  celerity  north  of  the  Chickamauga,  Crittenden 
established  himself  along  that  river  near  and  above  Lee  & 
Gordon's. 

On  the  13th  Bragg  had  ordered  an  attack  upon  him  by 
Polk  with  two  corps  and  the  promise  of  the  support  of  a  third, 
hoping  to  overthrow  this  wing,  in  continuance  of  his  plan  of 
defeating  the  Union  corps  in  detail,  before  the  center  or  right 
could  afford  relief.  In  the  face  of  such  threatening,  with 
McCook  over  fifty  miles  away,  and  Thomas  unable  to  move 
from  the  center  till  McCook  should  be  within  supporting  dis 
tance,  Rosecrans  undertook  the  concentration  of  his  army. 

At  this  point,  that  justice  may  be  done,  it  is  well  to  contrast 
the  attitude  which  the  governments  at  Washington  and  Rich 
mond  had  assumed  toward  this  movement  on  the  rebel  center. 

For  weeks  before  General  Rosecrans  had  moved  forward 
he  had  tried  to  impress  upon  the  authorities  at  Washington 
the  importance  of  giving  him  strong  support.  Promising 
offers  to  raise  veteran  mounted  troops  from  several  Eastern 
governors  were  laid  before  the  War  Department  and  refused 
with  insulting  warmth.  Two  weeks  later  came  the  order  from 
Halleck  to  move  at  once  and  keep  moving,  which  is  treated 
of  at  length  in  a  former  letter. 

This  gross  ignorance  at  Washington  of  the  gigantic  diffi 
culties  of  the  situation  was  equaled,  if  not  surpassed,  by  a 
telegram  of  September  11,  the  very  day  that  Bragg's  re-en 
forced  army  was  moving  against  Rosecrans'  center  and  or 
ganizing  for  an  attack  on  his  left,  and  while  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas  and  McCook  were  straining  every  nerve  in  a  life  and 
death  effort  to  concentrate  their  army.  Said  Halleck,  by 
telegraph  of  this  date  : 

"After  holding  the  mountain  passes  on  the  west  and 
Dal  ton,  or  some  point  on  the  railroad,  to  prevent  the  return 
of  Bragg's  army,  it  will  be  decided  whether  your  army  shall 
move  further  South  into  Georgia  and  Alabama.  It  is  re 
ported  here  that  a  part  of  Bragg's  army  is  re-enforcing  Lee. 
It  is  important  that  the  truth  of  this  should  be  ascertained 
as  early  as  possible." 

This  showed  that  Halleck  shared  the  general  and  ignorant 
belief  that  Rosecrans  had  occupied  Chattanooga  in  a  military 
sense. 

At  this  time  Longstreet's  advance  had  been  gone  a  week 
from  under  Halleck's  eyes  near  Washington,  and  two  divis 
ions  of  Johnston's  troops  from  Mississippi,  and  Buckner, 
from  East  Tennessee,  had  already  joined  Bragg,  and  others 
were  on  the  way. 


19 

The  failure  to  give  Rosecrans  effective  flanking  supports 
was  inexcusable.  The  only  explanation  for  it  is  found  in  the 
irritation  and  dislike  which  his  straightforward  and  independ 
ent  dealings  had  aroused  in  Washington,  and  a  failure  to 
understand  the  natural  obstacles  of  the  position  and  the  con 
templated  advance.  Meade  was  in  a  state  of  enforced  inactivity 
before  Lee.  Grant's  army  was  doing  nothing  to  occupy  John 
ston  in  Mississippi,  and  there  was  no  such  Union  activity  in 
front  of  Mobile  and  Charleston  as  prevented  troops  being 
spared  to  Bragg  from  those  points.  And  so,  while  the 
Washington  authorities  were  finding  fault  with  Rosecrans 
while  he  was  pushing  some  of  the  most  brilliant  and  effec 
tual  moves  of  the  war,  and  were  not  even  lifting  a  finger  to 
encourage  or  even  to  protect  him,  the  Richmond  government 
was  neglecting  no  means  to  strengthen  Bragg  to  the  extent 
of  its  powers.  As  a  result,  in  one  week  from  the  date  of 
Halleck's  telegram  inquiring  whether  Bragg  was  re  enforcing 
Lee,  Longstreet  and  Johnston  and  Walker  and  Buckner 
had  reached  Bragg  from  the  extremes  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  he  had  moved  to  attack  Rosecrans  with  TO, 000  men. 

In  this  criminal  neglect  of  Rosecrans  the  authorities  were 
without  excuse.  No  friend  of  Stanton's  or  Halleck's  have 
even  yet  attempted  to  explain,  much  less  defend  it.  These 
and  other  high  officers,  at  one  time  or  another,  arraigned 
General  Rosecrans  as  solely  responsible  for  what  they  chose 
to  designate  as  the  disaster  and  defeat  of  Chicamauga.  It 
was*  the  shortest  way  for  some  of  them  to  divert  attention 
from  the  terrible  neglect  and  responsibility  which  rested  on 
their  heads.  But  even  if  the  favorable  chances  for  the  con 
centration  of  Confederate  forces  against  Rosecrans  had  escaped 
unwilling  observation  at  Washington,  the  authorities  there 
were  without  excuse,  since  the  case  was  very  pointedly  placed 
before  them  in  an  editorial  of  the  Cincinnati  Commercial, 
which  excited  so  much  attention  that  the  editor  was  officially 
notified  that  such  articles  were  highly  indiscreet.  This  was 
as  early  as  September  1.  In  view  of  what  occurred  a  few 
weeks  later,  and  of  the  evidence  it  gives  of  ample  warning, 
it  is  interesting  to  reproduce  this  editorial  of  Mr.  Halstead, 
printed  on  the  date  named,  under  a  title,  a  "  Point  of  Dan 
ger."  Said  the  editor  : 

tf  Jeff  Davis  and  his  generals  are  as  well  informed  as  we  are 
of  the  presence  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  army  of  the  Po 
tomac  in  New  York  City  to  enforce  the  draft,  and  that  con 
sequently  an  advance  on  Richmond  need  not  be  apprehended 
for  some  weeks.  They  have  also  heard  of  the  presence  of 
Admiral  Farragut  in  New  York,  and  infer  from  the  circum 
stance  that  there  is  no  immediate  danger  of  an  attack  on 


20 

Mobile.  They  know  the  situation  at  Charleston,  and  are  not 
mistaken  in  the  opinion  that  the  advance  upon  that  city 
must  be  slow,  by  process  of  engineering,  digging,  and  heavy 
cannonading.  They  do  not  need  large  bodies  of  troops  to 
make  the  defense  ;  negro  laborers,  engineer  officers  and  gun 
ners  being  all  that  are  required.  General  Grant's  army,  as 
is  well  known,  is,  for  the  most  part,  resting  from  its  labors 
in  undisputed  possession  of  an  enormous  territory.  The  real 
aggressive  movement  of  the  Federal  forces  is  upon  the  rebel 
center  ;  that  is  to  say,  East  Tennessee,  and  it  is  extremely 
unlikely  that  the  rebels  are  deficient  in  information  as  to  the 
strength  and  intentions  of  Generals  Rosecrans  and  Burnside. 

"  The  important  question  is  whether  they  will  improve  the 
opportunity  by  concentrating  upon  their  center.  The  reports 
that  General  Joe  Johnston  has  joined  his  forces  to  those  re 
cently  under  Bragg,  and  has  thus  gathered  a  force  almost  if 
not  quite  equal  numerically  to  those  in  the  hands  of  General 
Rosecrans,  have  in  addition  the  immense  advantages  of  the 
occupation  of  mountain  passes,  and  that  are  to  be  found  in 
pursuing  a  defensive  system  of  warfare.  General  Lee  is  re 
ported  to  have  sent  troops  to  East  Tennessee,  and  it  is  prob 
able  that  he  has  done  so,  as,  thanks  to  the  New  York  riots,  he 
has  some  divisions  temporarily  to  spare  from  Virginia.  If 
the  rebels  do  give  up  East  Tenessee  and  Northern  Georgia 
without  a  struggte,  that  is  to  say,  if  Generals  Rosecrans  and 
Burnside  complete  the  operations  in  which  they  are  engaged 
without  meeting  serious  resistance,  it  may  he  taken  as  con 
clusive  evidence  of  the  exhaustion  of  the  rebellion." 

Several  subsequent  editorials  enforced  these  ideas,  and 
were  even  so  definite  as  to  point  out  Johston,  Longstreet, 
and  Buckner  as  the  commands  which  were  likely  to  re-en 
force  Bragg. 

General  Rosecrans  had  had  these  general  points  of  danger 
in  mind,  and  made  them  known  to  the  Government  nearly 
a  month  before  he  crossed  the  Tennessee.  But  his  request 
for  more  men  and  flanking  supports  was  refused  at  the  War 
Department  with  much  warmth  and  most  inconsiderate  em 
phasis.  This  Commercial  editorial,  therefore,  startled  him, 
and  his  records  show  that  he  sent  Mr.  Halstead  a  sharp  let 
ter  intimating  that  such  an  editorial  was  little  better  than 
a  call  to  the  Jeff  Davis  government  to  fall  on  him.  It  was, 
however,  the  clear  common  sense  of  the  situation  ;  and  if  the 
Washington  authorities  had  heeded  it,  instead  as  was  their 
custom,  sneering  at  "  newspaper  generals"  and  newspaper 
ways  of  carrying  on  the  war,  many  lives  would  have  been 
saved  at  Chickamauga  which  were  lost  because  of  the  un 
equal  contest,  and  there  would  never  have  been  any  question 
ing,  of  that  costly,  but  no  less  decided  victory. 


21 

It  is  further  true  that  General  Peck,  stationed  in  North 
Carolina,  sent  word  to  General  Kosecrans,  under  date  of 
September  6,  that  Longstreet's  corps  was  passing  southward 
over  the  railroads.  Colonel  Jacques,  of  the  Seventy-third 
Illinois,  who  had  come  up  from  the  South,  tried  in  vain  for 
ten  days  to  gain  admittance  in  Washington,  to  communicate 
this  fact  of  Longstreet's  movement  to  Halleck  and  Stanton, 
and  then,  without  accomplishing  it,  started  West,  and 
reached  his  command  in  time  to  fight  with  the  regiment  at 
Cbickamauga,  There  had  been  time  enough,  after  General 
Rosecrans's  explanations  of  his  proposed  plan,  to  force  Burn- 
side,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  down  from  East  Tennessee, 
and  to  have  brought  all  needed  strength  for  the  other  flank 
from  the  Array  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  Mississippi.  Even 
when  ordered  up,  after  the  battle,  this  latter  loitered  to  a 
degree  that  its  commander  will  never  be  able  to  satisfactorily 
explain. 

To  return  from  this  digression,  Bragg  on  the  13th  had 
ordered  an  attack  by  three  corps  on  Crittenden.  The  latter, 
by  his  great  activity  and  by  the  bold  operations  of  Van  Cleve, 
Wood,  Palmer,  and  the  brigades  of  Hazen,  Minty,  and 
Wilder,  had  created  the  impression  of  much  greater  strength 
than  they  really  had,  and  Polk  moved  cautiously.  Finally, 
just  as  he  was  ready  to  attack,  his  column  on  the  Lafayette 
road  encountered  Van  Cleve  moving  on  him  with  a  single 
brigade  of  infantry.  So  vigorously  did  this  officer  attack 
that  he  forced  Folk's  advance  back  for  three  miles,  and  cre 
ated  the  impression  of  a  general  Union  advance.  This  dis 
concerted  Polk,  and  instead  of  ordering  his  forces  forward, 
he  halted,  took  up  a  defensive  position,  and  sent  to  Bragg 
for  re-enforcements.  Thus  Negley  and  Baird,  by  their  pluck 
and  skill  in  front  of  overwhelming  forces,  and  Palmer  and 
Crittenden's  active  divisions  and  attached  brigades  on  the 
left,  by  their  unhesitating  attacks  wherever  they  developed 
the  enemy,  and  by  this  last  one  delivered  in  the  face  of  an 
advance  of  three  full  corps  on  one,  had  made  the  concentra 
tion  of  the  army  possible,  and  had  saved  it.  The  next  day 
Steedman,  that  lion  of  battle,  had  reached  Rossville,  in  im 
mediate  support  of  Crittenden,  with  two  brigades  of  his  own 
command  and  two  regiments  and  two  batteries  temporarily 
attached,  having  marched  from  Bridgeport,  a  distance  of  forty 
miles,  in  twenty-eight  hours. 

The  appearance  and  wonderful  activity  of  Hazen,  Wilder, 
and  Minty's  brigades  on  the  left  of  Crittenden's,  and  Steed- 
man's  forces  of  the  reserve  corps  at  Rossville,  with  the  iact 
that  McCook  was  nearing  Thomas,  and  that  the  latter  had 
extended  his  left  to  within  near  supporting  distance  of  Critten- 


22 

den,  seem  to  have  restrained  Bragg  from  attack  in  any 
direction  after  the  failure  of  his  orders  to  Polk  to  attack  on 
the  13th  until  his  orders  of  the  night  of  the  17th  for  an  attack 
the  next  day  upon  Crittenden's  left  and  rear. 

During  this  period  of  comparative  inaction  against  the 
Union  front,  Rosecrans  insured  the  concentration  of  his 
army  in  time  for  hattle.  McCook,  not  understanding  the 
roads  along  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and  not  deeming  it 
prudent  to  consume  the  time  necessary  to  explore  them,  had 
crossed  Lookout  twice,  at  the  cost  of  more  than  a  full  day, 
and  appeared  with  his  head  of  column  at  General  Thomas's 
camps  during  the  16th.  On  the  17th  the  latter  closed  the 
heads  of  his  columns  toward  Crittenden. 

The  days  of  concentration  had  been  a  period  of  the  most 
intense  anxiety,  of  unceasing  watchfulness,  of  unbending 
determination,  of  brilliant  minor  affairs,  of  unflinching  cour 
age,  and,  withal,  of  cool  calculation  and  precise  execution 
for  every  part  of  the  army. 

While,  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  the  three  corps  of  the 
Union  army  and  its  reserve  were  in  position  where  each 
could  support  the  other  if  attacked,  its  supreme  effort  for 
position  was  to  come.  Bragg's  order  for  battle  contem 
plated  crossing  the  Chicamauga  some  miles  below  Lee  and 
Gordon's  and  driving  the  Union  left  under  Crittenden  back  on 
the  center  and  right  under  Thomas  and  McCook,  and  thus, 
by  thrusting  his  columns  between  Rosecrans  and  Chatta 
nooga,  recover  that  place  and  force  the  Union  army  back  into 
the  mountains,  from  which  position  it  is  doubtful  if  it  could 
have  extricated  itself. 

Bragg's  order  for  attack  on  the  18th  could  not  be  executed. 
His  army  was  concentrated  between  Lee  and  Gordon's  and 
Lafayette.  He  moved  with  five  Infantry  and  two  cavalry 
corps.  Narrow  roads,  small  bridges,  difficult  fords,  and 
dense  forests  delayed  operations,  so  that  at  nightfall  of  the 
18th  his  troops  were  not  in  position  to  attack.  In  fact,  he 
was  scarcely  ready  to  deliver  battle  under  his  plan  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  when  Thomas's  unexpected  attack,  far 
on  the  rebel  right,  deranged  Braggs's  plan,  and  forced  him 
to  battle  several  miles  from  the  point  where  he  was  about 
to  open  it  on  Crittenden,  who  he  supposed  still  constituted 
the  L^nion  left. 

It  was  nothing  less  than  the  inversion  of  the  Union  army 
under  cover  of  a  night  that  had  thus  disconcerted  Bragg  and 
enabled  Rosecrans  to  array  himself  for  battle  between  Bragf 
and  Chattanooga,  and  across  the  roads  and  in  front  of  the 
passes  which  led  to  that  city.  It  was  this  night  march  of 
two  corps  which  constituted  the  supreme  movement  of  the 


THE  CONCENTRATION. 


23 

concentration,  and  which  at  the  same  time  defeated  Bragg's 
purpose  to  fight  with  the  back  of  his  own  army  to  Chatta 
nooga  with  a  view  to  its  recovery. 

The  map  given  below  will  make  this  inversion  and  final 
concentration  clear,  and  show  the  position  of  the  two  armies 
at  daylight  on  the  19th,  when  the  battle  began. 

On  the  17th  General  Thomas's  corps  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Pond  Spring,  Negley  on  the  left,  and  so  nearest  to  a  junction 
with  Crittenden  at  Lee  &  Gordon's,  Baird  next  to  the  right, 
and  Brannan  next.  Reynolds  was  thrown  to  the  front.  The 
left  of  McCook  had  closed  on  Thomas  at  Pond  Spring. 

During  the  day  Bragg,  strongly  threatening  Crittenden  at 
Lee  &  Gordon's  with  two  divisions,  held  him  fast,  and  started 
the  rest  of  his  army  down  the  Chickamauga  to  cross  and 
sweep  in  on  Crittenden 's  left  and  rear,  expecting  to  find  him 
still  constituting  the  left  of  the  Union  army,  and  to  double 
this  left  back  on  Thomas  and  McCook. 

Bushrod  Johnson  had  crossed  at  Reed's  Bridge,  driven 
Wilder  nearly  to  the  State  road  at  Vineyard's,  and  bivou 
acked  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Crittenden's  left.  Walker  had 
also  crossed  at  Lambert's  Ford  with  three  divisions  and  For 
rest's  cavalry  division,  and  halted  for  the  night  about  a  mile 
in  the  rear  of  Hood.  For  the  most  part  Bragg's  army  had 
the  full  night  for  rest. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  columns  were  alive  with 
motion.  That  night  was  to  cover  the  inversion  of  an  army. 
About  4  o'clock  Thomas  started  his  whole  corps  from  Pond 
Spring  toward  Crittenden,  McCook  following  him.  This  was 
doubtless  interpreted  by  Bragg  as  a  closing  in  on  Crittenden. 
But  it  was  far  more  than  that. 

As  soon  as  night  shut  the  columns  in  they  were  pressed 
rapidly  to  the  left.  Negley,  as  he  drew  near  to  Crittenden, 
was  moved  to  the  Chickamauga  in  front  of  Crawfish  Springs. 
This  prevented  a  night  attempt  to  cut  the  column  by  occupy 
ing  the  roads  intersecting  at  that  point.  Meantime  Thomas, 
with  his  other  three  divisions,  pushed  on.  It  was  a  long, 
weary  night.  Heavy  trains  of  supplies  and  ammunition 
occupied  the  road.  The  troops  moved  mostly  through  the 
adjacent  fields,  both  for  celerity  of  marching  and  as  guards 
to  the  trains.  Heavy  flanking  forces  streamed  along  parallel 
to  the  road,  and  well  out  toward  the  river.  There  were 
constant  interruptions  to  continuous  movement,  causing  fre 
quent  halts  of  the  infantry.  The  night  was  cool,  and,  as 
the  commands  stopped,  the  men  warmed  themselves  by  start 
ing  fires  in  the  fences.  The  result  was  that  toward  midnight 
the  trains  were  everywhere  driving  between  two  continuous 
lines  of  fires,  and  the  men  on  either  side,  or  in  the  road,  had 


24 

constant  facilities  for  warming  themselves.  It  was  a  tedious 
and  most  fatiguing  night,  but  at  daylight  the  vitally  im 
portant  task  was  done.  Thomas's  head  of  column,  Baird  in 
advance,  reached  the  Kelly  farm  at  daylight,  with  Brannan 
well  closed  up  and  Reynolds  a  short  distance  in  the  rear. 
Brannan  was  on  the  State  or  Lafayette  road,  near  the  inter 
section  of  the  road  leading  into  it  from  Reed's  bridge.  McCook 
had  reached  a  point  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Crittenden,  near 
Crawfish  Springs.  And  so  at  sunrise  the  Union  right,  in 
stead  of  resting  far  up  the  Chickamauga  from  Crittenden's 
position,  as  Bragg  expected  to  find  it,  had  become  the  left  of 
Rosecrans'  army  and  Crittenden  was  the  right.  More  than 
this,  Rosecrans  had  established  his  lines  two  miles  beyond 
Bragg's  right,  and  between  it  and  Chattanooga.  The  victory 
of  concentration  had  been  followed  by  the  equally  important 
success  of  inverting  the  army  and  thus  thrusting  its  columns 
between  the  enemy  and  the  objective  of  the  campaign.  These 
second  stages  of  the  movement  deserve  to  take  rank  with  the 
matchless  strategy  with  which  it  was  inaugurated. 

But  the  battle  for  the  firm  and  final  possession  of  Chatta 
nooga  was  still  to  come.  It  opened  suddenly  for  both  sides, 
and  for  Bragg  in  a  wholly  unexpected  quarter.  The  weary 
Union  troops  had  scarcely  time  to  cook  their  coffee  after  the 
night  march,  and  some  of  them  no  time  at  all,  before  the 
storm  broke  and  the  army  was  summoned  to  the  battle  which 
Thomas  had  opened. 

H.  V.  B. 


WASHINGTON,  August  14. — [Special.] — The  last  letter  in 
this  series  left  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th  of  September,  concentrated  for  battle  on  the  field 
of  Chickamauga.  By  an  energetic  night  march  the  army 
had  been  thrown  forward  on  its  left  by  inversion  into  line, 
and  thrust  between  the  enemy  and  Chattanooga,  the  objective 
of  the  campaign.  It  was  a  difficult  and  dangerous  move 
ment,  where  two  armies,  intent  on  battle,  were  only  separated 
by  such  a  stream  as  the  Chickamauga,  which  was  everywhere 
easily  fordable  above  Lee  &  Gordon's.  But  General  Thomas, 
who  led  this  column,  is  the  one  commander  of  a  great  army 
of  whom  it  can  be  said  with  accuracy  that  from  the  first  of 
the  war  to  the  close  no  movement  of  his  miscarried.  At  day 
light  of  the  19th  he  held  the  Lafayette  and  Chattanooga  road 
at  the  Kelly  farm. 

Bragg' s  army,  though  re-enforced  from  all  parts  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  though  it  had  been  well  concentrated  be 
tween  Lafayette  and  Gordon's  mills  for  several  preceding 
days,  had  been  skillfully  foiled  by  General  Kosecrans  in  the 
efforts  to  strike  his  isolated  corps.  During  the  18th  it  had 
been  pressed  by  Bragg  down  the  winding  and  thickly- 
wooded  valley  of  the  Chickamauga  in  execution  of  an  order 
for  battle.  This  order  was  based  upon  the  idea  that  Critten- 
den's  corps  at  Lee  &  Gordon's  was  the  left  of  the  Union 
army.  While  he  was  to  be  held  there  by  strong  force  threat 
ening  attack  from  the  other  side  of  the  stream,  the  bulk  of 
Bragg's  army  was  to  cross  at  the  various  fords  and  bridges 
below,  and,  turning  up  stream,  was  then  to  join  in  sweeping 
Crittenden  back  on  Thomas  and  McCook,  whom  Bragg  sup 
posed  still  to  constitute  the  Union  center  and  right.  In  exe 
cution  of  this  plan  Bushrod  Johnson  had  crossed  at  Heed's 
bridge,  and  pushed  up  to  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Lee  & 
Gordon's,  and  westward  to  within  a  mile  of  the  Lafayette 
road,  where  night  overtook  him.  Walker's  corps  had  crossed 
below  Alexander's  Bridge,  and  bivouacked  alter  a  short  ad 
vance  toward  Crittenden.  Minty  and  Wilder,  with  their 
mounted  men,  and  Dan  McCook,  with  his  brigade,  had 
stoutly  resisted  and  greatly  delayed  these  columns.  The  most 
of  Bragg's  army  had  rested  through  the  night.  Two  corps 
of  Kosecrans's  forces  had  marched  continuously  since  four 
o'clock  the  preceding  afternoon.  They  were  about  to  move 
into  battle  without  time  for  breakfast  or  further  rest.  Bragg, 
upon  Longstree*t's  arrival,  would  have  70,000  men  available 
for  the  fight.  Rosecrans's  strength  for  battle  was  not  over 
56,000. 


26 

At  daylight  all  of  Bragg's  army,  wholly  concealed  by  the 
forests,  was  in  motion.  A  considerable  portion  of  it  was  still 
crossing  the  river  at  the  various  fords  and  bridges  from  Tel- 
ford's  to  Reed's  bridge,  and  deploying  on  the  other  side  to 
ward  Crittenden ,  who  was  still  supposed  to  hold  the  Union  left. 

Suddenly,  about  9  o'clock,  there  came  to  Bragg's  ears  the 
sounds  of  heavy  and  unexpected  battle  far  down  the  Chicka- 
rnauga  and  well  toward  Rossville.  Thomas,  whose  head  of 
column  rested  at  the  Kelly  farm,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
exploring  the  forests  in  his  front  and  to  test  the  truth  of  a 
report  that  an  isolated  brigade  of  the  enemy  was  on  the  west 
side  of  the  river  near  Reed's  bridge,  moved  Brannan  ^and 
Baird  directly  into  the  forest  on  the  road  towards  Reed's.  At 
this  time  two-thirds  of  Bragg's  army,  concealed  by  the  for 
ests,  had  crossed  the  Chickamauga  and  was  directing  its  col 
umns  up  that  stream  toward  Crittenden.  Just  at  the  time 
when  Bragg  expected  that  his  right  would  have  swung 
across  the  Lafayette  road,  and  that  his  center  divisions  would 
have  opened  on  Crittenden's  position  at  Lee  &  Gordon's, 
these  portentous  sounds  of  battle  from  Thomas's  line  aston 
ished  and  perplexed  him.  After  vainly  waiting  for  them 
to  cease,  under  the  first  impression  that  the  affair  was  a  move 
ment  of  his  forces  in  reconnoissance,  and  that  some  Union 
cavalry  had  been  encountered,  he  found  it  so  serious  as  to  de 
range  his  whole  plan  of  battle,  and  force  him  to  meet  an 
enemy  who  had  turned  his  right.  To  do  this  he  was  obliged 
to  move  a  portion  of  his  troops  that  had  not  crossed  the  river 
down  stream  to  Reed's.  By  the  circuitous  roads  which  they 
were  obliged  to  travel,  it  required  a  march  of  six  miles  to 
reach  the  left  of  Thomas. 

This  destruction  of  the  rebel  plan  was  due  to  Thomas 
opening  the  battle  with  the  divisions  of  Brannan  and  Baird 
in  the  vicinity  of  Reed's  bridge.  At  6.30  o'clock  Brannan  left 
Kelly's,  and  moving  north,  turned  in  from  the  Lafayette 
road  at  McDaniel's  toward  Reed's.  A  quarter  of  a  mile  from 
McDaniel's  he  deployed  his  division.  Van  Derveer  was  on 
the  left,  and  thus  became  the  left  of  the  Union  army.  Cou 
ncil's  brigade  was  in  the  center,  and  Croxton  on  the  right. 
In  like  manner  Baird  advanced  with  a  front  line  of  two  bri 
gades.  King,  with  the  regulars,  was  on  the  left,  next  to 
Brannan,  and  Scribner  on  the  right  of  King,  while  Stark 
weather  marched  by  the  flank  behind  Scribner's  right. 

The  last  disposition  was  promptly  made  by  Baird  upon  his 
discovering  that  the  enemy  was  in  strong  force  to  his  right. 

Thus  while  neither  army  was  aware  that  the  other  was  in 
heavy  force  in  the  woods  which  surrounded  them,  and  while 
Bragg's  forces  were  forming  to  move  up  the  Chickamauga,  and 


ROSSVILLE       GAP 

W    £^ 

I 

i 


STEEDMJN 


VIDITOE 


KELLEY  I   /' 

as/on    |    j 


CHAW  FISH 


xEED    BRIDGE 


MAP  OF   FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE. 


26a 


27 

so  away  from  Thomas's  line  of  march ,  both  Brannan  and  Baird 
came  in  force  on  Bragg's  right,  in  front  of  Reed's  bridge,  at 
a  point  near  Jay's  Mills,  and  opened  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga.  Croxton  struck  first  with  a  vigorous  attack  on  For 
rest,  who,  with  the  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  was  guarding 
the  Confederate  right.  The  cavalrymen  were  forced  back  to 
the  sawmill,  where  they  rallied,  dismounted,  and  began  to 
fight  as  infantry.  Croxton  held  his  own,  and  even  ad 
vanced  slightly.  Forrest  sent  for  infantry,  and  Wilson's 
brigade  of  Walker's  division  hurried  from  Alexander's  and 
rushed  into  the  fight. 

Meantime  re-enforcements  were  turning  from  all  portions 
of  Bragg' s  line  toward  the  sound  of  furious  battle.  Shortly 
the  advance  toward  Crittenden  ceased,  so  vigorous  had 
Thomas's  battle  become,  Connell  and  Van  Derveer  at  first 
meeting  no  enemy  on  their  fronts  pressed  toward  the  vortex 
of  Croxton's  fighting.  Forrest,  relieved  by  Walker's  infan 
try,  met  this  advance  of  Brannan's  left  with  his  whole  force 
and  fought  for  the  most  part  on  foot.  Croxton,  out  of  am 
munition,  was  obliged  to  retire  somewhat  before  Walker, 
when  Baird  pushed  King  in  to  support  him,  while  Van  Der 
veer  and  Connell  moved  in  first  on  Forrest  and  next  on 
Ector's  brigade  of  Walker's  reserve.  The  battle  became 
terrific.  Forrest  hurried  in  person  after  infantry  supports, 
and  for  portions  of  his  own  command  left  near  Alexander's. 

At  11  o'clock  Bragg  had  become  convinced  that  Rosecrans 
had  forced  battle  upon  him  on  the  extreme  rebel  right. 
With  such  vigor  did  Thomas's  two  divisions  fight  that 
Walker  was  ordered  at  that  hour  to  go  to  Forrest  with  all 
his  force,  and  Cheatham,  of  Folk's  corps,  who  had  the 
strongest  division  of  the  army,  consisting  of  five  brigades, 
then  stationed  as  the  reserve  of  Bragg's  left.  Hardly  had 
Cheatham  started  before  Stewart,  of  Buckner's  corps,  which 
was  near  Tedford's  Ford,  ready  to  move  toward  Crittenden, 
was  also  dispatched  in  haste  to  the  Confederate  right,  and 
at  1  o'clock  Cleburne,  of  Hill's  corps,  posted  near  the  ex 
treme  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  was  ordered  to  the  scene 
of  action  before  Brannan  and  Baird.  These  movements 
show  how  Bragg's  plan  of  battle  had  been  wholly  over 
turned,  and  how  fierce  the  fighting  of  these  two  divisions 
of  Thomas  must  have  been  to  decide  Bragg  to  send  four 
infantry  divisions  to  the  assistance  of  Forrest's  corps  of  two 
divisions. 

Meantime  Walker  had  moved  Govan's  brigade  obliquely 
on  the  right  flank  of  Scribner  and  forced  him  back.  Simul 
taneously  Walthall's  brigade  struck  King  in  flank  and  drove 
him  in  disorder  over  Van  Derveer's  brigade.  Guenther's 


28 

regular  battery,  one  of  the  best  and  most  efficient  in  tbe 
service,  was  captured.  We  shall  see  how  it  was  shortly  after 
retaken  by  the  splendid  Ninth  Ohio. 

Thus,  while  Baird's  lines  were  shaken  by  the  overwhelm 
ing  concentration  against  them,  and  Brannan  was  facing 
and  fighting  superior  numbers,  matters  were  hot  for  Thomas, 
who  was  slowly  moving  to  and  fro  along  his  divisions  and 
closely  watching  them.  Baird  was  restoring  his  lines  under 
fire  and  in  the  face  of  a  flank  attack  Croxton's  men,  with 
fresh  ammunition,  were  holding  their  place.  Council's  bri 
gade  was  immovable,  and  poured  its  fire  into  the  very  faces 
of  the  enemy.  Van  Derveer,  on  the  left,  was  busily  maneu 
vering  to  meet  flank  attacks,  and  fighting  desperately,  but 
with  unvarying  success. 

At  this  moment,  when  Baird  was  scarcely  able  to  maintain 
position,  and  must  have  soon  yielded  to  numbers,  Johnson, 
of  McCook's  corps,  came  on  the  field  from  Crawfish  Springs, 
and  was  led  by  Thomas  to  the  right  of  Baird.  Here,  with 
the  brigades  of  Willich  and  Baldwin  on  the  front  and 
Dodge  in  reserve,  Johnson,  by  heavy  fighting,  relieved  the 
pressure  on  Baird,  restored  the  line,  and  checked  Bragg's 
new  center. 

Following  came  Palmer,  most  opportunely  ordered  for 
ward  by  Crittenden  from  Lee  &  Gordon's,  who  saw  plainly 
from  the  development  of  furious  battle  on  the  Union  left  that 
troops  would  surely  be  wanted  there.  Palmer  followed 
Johnson  into  line,  and  under  the  personal  direction  of 
Rosecransthe  brigades  of  Hazen,Cruft,  and  Grose  were  formed 
in  echelon  and  ordered  forward,  immediately  encountering 
Cheatham's  men  and  becoming  fiercely  engaged.  Hazeu  on 
the  left  fell  with  great  vigor  on  Walker's  left  and  relieved 
Starkweather,  of  Baird,  from  precarious  position.  At  the 
same  time  Van  Derveer  was  thrown  by  Brannan  on  the  right 
of  Walker  and  by  terrific  fighting  crushed  Walthall's  line 
and  drove  it  well  back  into  the  forests. 

It  was  here  that  the  Ninth  Ohio,  the  German  Turner  reg 
iment  of  Bob  McCook — both  regiment  and  commander  of 
glorious  memory — recaptured  the  regular  battery  and 
brought  it  into  the  Union  lines.  The  regiment  had  been 
with  the  trains  during  the  night  march  and  it  was  chafing 
far  in  the  rear  when  Van  Derveer  sent  for  it.  Sore  was  his 
need.  The  repeated  attacks  of  the  enemy  on  his  front  and 
flank  in  the  attempt  to  crush  the  Union  left  and  reach  the 
Lafayette  road  in  its  rear  were  becoming  so  frequent  and 
heavy  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  every  man  under  him 
was  fighting  where  he  stood  and  yielding  no  inch  of  ground, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  limit  of  human  endurance  even  for  iron 


29 

veterans  must  soon  be  reached.  Then  from  the  near  distance 
came  the  well-known  hurrah  of  the  Ninth  advancing  from 
the  right.  As  all  waited  to  welcome  the  head  of  its  column, 
its  charging  shout  was  heard  to  the  front  of  its  line  of  ad 
vance,  followed  at  once  by  rapid  musketry,  and  then  their 
great  "hurrah"  of  victory.  The  story  is  brief.  Colonel 
Kammerling  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  coming  on  at  dou 
ble-quick,  saw  to  his  right  and  front  the  captured  artillery  of 
the  regulars,  just  taken  by  Grovan.  Without  order  s  he 
halted  his  line,  fronted  it,  and  with  the  command  "  Links 
Schwengket,"  swung  it  to  the  left,  faced  toward  the  hill 
where  the  battery  stood  in  the  hands  of  its  captors,  and 
with  a  sweeping  charge  drove  the  rebels  back,  bayoneting 
some  among  the  guns,  and  rushed  with  guns  and  many  pris 
oners  back  to  the  Union  line.  A  few  minutes  after  he  came 
in  on  the  run  to  Van  Derveer,  just  in  time  to  take  part  in 
the  last  and  supreme  effort  of  the  enemy  to  crush  that  un 
yielding  left.  Forrest's  men  had  passed  beyond  Van  Der- 
veer's  left  and  formed  for  assault  on  his  front,  and  also  di 
rectly  on  his  flank.  But  the  vigilant  skirmishers  and  pris 
oners  taken  by  them  made  known  the  movement.  The  left 
was  thrown  back  in  time,  and  the  line  presenoed  an  obtuse 
angle  opening  toward  the  enemy.  Into  this,  and  heavily 
against  the  left  of  it,  Forrest  hurled  his  columns,  four  deep. 
On  came  these  men  in  gray  in  magnificent  lines,  which 
showed  clearly  through  the  open  forest  bending  their  faces 
before  the  sleet  of  the  storm,  and  firing  hotly  as  they  ad 
vanced.  As  they  came  within  the  range  of  the  oblique  fire 
from  Van  Derveer's  right  they  halted  within  forty  yards 
of  his  left  and  for  a  few  moments  poured  in  a  destructive 
fire.  A  wheel  of  Smith's  regular  battery,  and  of  a  section 
of  Church's  guns  which  had  reported,  brought  themw  here  they 
poured  a  nearly  enfilading  fire  of  cannister  down  those  long 
lines,  standing  bravely  there  and  fighting  almost  under  the 
mouths  ot  the  guns.  Thomas  and  Brannan  and  Van  Der 
veer  were  looking  on  and  encouraging  the  line.  It  had 
seemed  almost  beyond  the  probabilities  to  hold  it  till  those 
well  served  batteries  opened.  An  instant  later  it  seemed  as 
if  the  lines  of  gray  had  sunk  into  the  earth.  When  the 
smoke  lifted  from  the  third  round  the  front  was  clear  of  every 
thing  but  the  heaps  of  dead  and  wounded,  and  the  work  of 
the  day  at  that  point  of  the  Union  left  was  done. 

The  fight  still  raged  bitterly,  however,  along  the  lines  of 
Johnson,  and  of  Palmer  to  the  right  of  him.  Brannan  and 
Baird  were  withdrawn  from  the  front  which  they  had  held, 
the  former  being  sent  toward  the  center  to  provideagainstcon- 
tiugencies  there,  and  the  latter  posted  to  prevent  any  move- 


30 

ment  toward  the  Layfayette  road  at  McDaniel's.  Forrest  and 
Cheathara's  brigades  of  infantry  next  attacked  Johnson  (of 
McCook),  who  then  held  the  advanced  portion  of  the  Union 
left.  Here  the  contest  soon  became  furious  again,  partly  on 
the  ground  of  Baird's  morning  battle.  Maney's  splendid  bri 
gade  rushed  to  a  hand-to-hand  fight,  but  was  borne  back. 
Wright,  Strahl,  Jackson,  and  Smith,  with  their  brigades, 
all  under  Cheatham,  each  delivered  bold  and  most  cour 
ageous  attacks_,  but  without  carrying  the  Union  line.  Rose- 
crans's  army,  under  the  successive  hammering  of  the  Con 
federate  onslaughts,  was  fast  being  solidly  formed  from  left 
to  right.  Willich,  Baldwin,  and  Dodge,  of  Johnson,  and 
Hazen,  Cruft,  and  Grose,  of  Palmer,  were  fairly  aligned, 
having  fought  themselves  forward  into  good  positions. 

The  battle  next  fell  heavily  on  the  right  of  Palmer,  as 
Bragg  at  last  had  his  whole  army  in  rapid  motion  toward 
his  right.  As  Palmer's  ammunition  began  to  fail,  Reynolds 
moved  up  to  his  right  and  rear,  arid  made  most  excellent 
dispositions  just  east  of  the  Lafayette  road.  Upon  call,  he 
pushed  Willich  and  Edward  King  in  on  Palmer's  right,  and 
at  once  became  hotly  engaged.  Crittenden  sent  Van  Cleve 
with  Samuel  Beatty's  and  Dick's  brigades  to  the  right  of 
Reynold's,  leaving  Barnes's  brigade  with  General  Wood  at 
Lee  &  Gordon's. 

As  fast  as  the  Union  line  could  be  extended  to  the  left  it 
became  sorely  pressed  by  Bragg' s  troops,  then  well  massed 
west  of  the  Chickamauga.  General  Davis,  from  McCook, 
pressed  rapidly  to  the  left  and  was  sent  in  near  Vineyard's. 
At  3  o'clock  Wood  was  ordered  from  Lee  &  Gordon's  to  the 
field  of  the  growing  fight.  As  Bragg  still  had  some  forces 
opposite  this  point.  General  Lytle's  brigade,  of  Sheridan's 
division,  was  directed  to  relieve  Wood  and  hold  the  crossing. 
Thus  in  six  hours  from  the  time  Bragg  was  directing  his 
army  on  Crittenden  at  Lee  &  Gordon's,  a  single  brigade, 
posted  there  only  from  prudence,  served  for  all  demands 
against  Confederate  movement  from  that  direction.  This  in 
dicates  how  completely  Bragg  had  been  driven  from  his  plan. 

Wood  and  Davis  had  not  been  dispatched  a  moment  too 
soon.  Van  Cleve,  Davis,  and  Wood  were  confronted  with 
solid  masses  of  Bragg's  concentrated  troops,  and  the  scenes 
arid  splendid  fighting  of  the  morning  at  the  left  were  re 
peated  hereby  these  divisions.  Stewart,  Johnson,  and  Pres 
ton,  of  Buckner's  corps,  and  Hindmau,  of  Longstreet's 
advance,  were  assaulting  these  lines.  Davis  had  been 
ordered  to  wheel  in  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  this 
movement  led  to  one  of  the  bravest  and  bloodiest  contests 
of  the  day  in  front  of  Vineyard's-  Wood  advanced -his 


31 

lines  into  the  vortex  just  when  David  was  hardest  pressed, 
and,  when  all  seemed  about  to  he  compelled  to  yield,  Sheri 
dan  appeared  on  the  flank,  and  Wilder's  mounted  brigade 
came  up  in  the  rear.  Every  division  of  the  Union  army  was 
in  line  except  the  reserve  under  Granger,  which  was  some 
miles  away  toward  Ringgold,  with  orders  to  hold  Red  House 
bridge. 

The  battle  along  Rosecrans's  center  and  right  waxed  hotter 
and  fiercer.  He  seemed  everywhere  present  and  he  was 
everywhere  alert.  Van  Cleve  encountered  the  left  of  Stewart 
marching  to  relieve  Cheatham,  and  a  fight  muzzle  to  muzzle 
took  place  between  Clayton  of  Stewart's  and  the  two  brigades 
of  Van  Cleve,  Sam  Beatty  and  Dick. 

Reynolds,  by  magnificent  generalship  and  fighting,  re 
stored  the  broken  line  in  his  front,  and  firmly  established 
himself  there.  His  brigades,  under  Turchin  and  Edward 
King,  covered  themselves  with  laurels  as  they  swayed  back 
and  forth  on  the  tides  of  battles  which  rushed  and  swirled 
over  all  that  portion  of  the  field. 

Davis,  with  the  brigades  of  Carlin  and  Heg,  delivered  their 
fire  at  short  range,  and  stood  their  ground  long  and  well, 
till  borne  back  by  overwhelming  forces.  It  was  just  as  this 
slow  retrograde  movement  began  that  Wood  had  appeared, 
having  marched  rapidly  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  with  Bark- 
ex's  and  Buell's  brigade  of  his  own-division  and  Barnes's  of 
Van  Cleve's.  They  swept  in  on  the  right,  and  bj  splendid 
fighting  checked  the  rebel  line  and  held  it  on  their  front  in 
spite  of  its  vigorous  and  splendid  fighting. 

At  this  point  two  exactly  opposite  movements  were  in 
progress  along  the  lines  of  the  armies.  Bragg,  who  seemed 
determined  to  push  his  right  between  the  Union  left  and 
Chattanooga,  ordered  Cleburne  from  Tedford's  Ford  to  the 
extreme  right,  the  scene  of  the  morning  fighting.  At  the 
same  time  General  Thomas,  convinced  that  no  perilous  attack 
could  be  delivered  at  that  hour  from  that  extreme  point,  was 
bringing  Brannan  from  the  left  to  the  support  of  Reynolds 
just  as  the  latter  was  fighting  to  push  the  enemy  from  the 
Lafayette  road.  Brannan  arrived  in  time  to  help,  and  with 
Croxton's  assistance  Reynolds  restored  the  lines  on  his  front 
and  flank,  and  regained  possession  of  the  road.  Negley  also 
arrived  opportunely  from  the  right  and  took  active  part  at 
this  point.  Wood  repulsed  Bush  rod  Johnson's  division, 
though  at  great  cost.  Trigg,  of  Preston's  division,  entirely 
Iresh,  moved  in  with  splendid  pluck  and  movement  to  restore 
the  line,  but  Sheridan-,  from  McCook,  with  Bradley  and 
Laiboldt's  brigades,  met  and  checked  this  advance,  and  with 
its  recoil  the  heat  of  battle  on  the  Union  right  began  to  subside. 


32 

About  5  o'clock  the  field  on  both  sides  was  still.  But 
Cleburne  and  Walker  were  moving  again  far  on  the  rebel 
right,  in  obedience  to  Bragg's  order  to  again  attack  the  Union 
left.  The  Confederate  march  was  over  the  field  of  the  morn 
ing,  where  the  dead  of  Walker  were  thickly  strewed.  It 
wa8  a  depressing  advance.  Still  those  veterans  formed  and 
moved  on  without  a  sign  of  shrinking,  and  about  six  o'clock 
the  hour  of  silence  was  broken  by  a  terrifie  attack  in  the 
gathering  dusk  upon  Johnson,  near  the  ground  occupied  by 
Baird  in  the  morning.  The  assault  fell  also  upon  Baird  fur 
ther  to  the  left.  Cleburne,  with  a  front  of  a  mile,  filled  by 
three  brigades,  had  suddenly  burst  upon  Thomas's  left. 
Cleburne  had  three  brigades — Polk,  Wood,  and  Deshler. 
Walthall  and  Govan,  of  Liddell's  division,  and  three  brigades 
of  Cleburne — Strahl,  Johnson,  and  Preston  Smith — supported 
him.  The  assault  was  tremendous.  Night  was  falling,  and 
the  aim  of  each  side  was  directed  by  the  flashes  of  the  guns. 

Willich,  Dodge  and  Baldwin,  of  Johnson,  fought  their 
brigades  with  undaunted  pluck  and  endurance.  Baldwin  fell 
on  his  line.  Baird,  with  Scribner,  King,  and  Starkweathar, 
held  their  ground,  though  vigorously  attacked.  Preston 
Smith,  on  the  Confederate  side,  was  killed  here.  Darkness 
put  an  end  to  the  movement  and  the'  fighting,  and  each 
army  sought  rest. 

For  the  commanders  of  all  grades  it  was  a  busy  night. 
While  the  Union  line  was  continuous  and  measurably  com 
pact  between  the  enemy  and  practicable  roads  to  Chatta 
nooga,  there  was  much  realignment  to  be  done  to  better  the 
position  for  the  morrow.  The  Union  troops  obtained  only 
snatches  of  rest  on  ground  white  with  frost.  No  fires  were 
lighted,  lest  the  direction  of  the  lines  might  be  revealed. 
This  made  supper  a  dry  meal.  But  the  fact  that  for  most 
there  had  been  no  time  for  breakfast  and  none  at  all  for 
dinner,  gave  excellent  relish  even  to  a  dry  supper. 

Rosecrans's  purpose  of  establishing  his  lines  between  the 
enemy  and  Chattanooga  had  been  accomplished.  Bragg's 
plan  of  thrusting  his  army  between  the  Union  advance  and 
the  city  had  been  defeated.  At  the  close  of  this  first  day 
victory  rested  with  Rosecrans.  He  had  found  himself  largely 
outnumbered,  and  had  thrown  every  available  man  into  the 
fight. 

Bragg  had  many  brigades  which  were  not  engaged,  and 
Longstreet,  with  the  greater  part  of  his  force,  was  yet  to  ar 
rive.  The  spirit  of  the  Union  army  had  risen  to  a  high  pitch 
under  the  splendid  and  most  effective  fighting  which  it  had 
done,  and  it  looked  forward  to  the  morrow  with  a  confidence 
born  of  the  consciousness  of  fighting  and  staying  powers. 


33 

But  hard  as  the  work  of  the  day  had  been,  and  stubborn 
and  bitter  as  was  the  fighting  in  each  army,  the  coming 
Sunday  was  to  witness  a  battle  eclipsing  this  and  surpassing 
all  the  war  for  its  pluck  and  tleadliness.  While  the  weary 
commanders  were  preparing  for  this  day,  and  tired  sentinels 
kept  faithful  watch,  the  wounded  suffered  and  the  armies 
slept. 

H.  V.  B. 


WASHINGTON,  August  17. — [Special.] — The  second  and  final 
fight  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga  opened  on  Sunday, 
September  20.  We  have  seen  how  through  the  preceding 
day,  in  the  white  heat  of  battle,  the  Union  lines  had  estab 
lished  themselves  on  thje  field  of  Chickamauga,  and  that  at 
nightfall  they  were  still  between  Bragg  and  the  city  for  which 
they  were  fighting. 

It  was  a  cool  and  beautiful  morning,  though  heavy  fog 
hung  over  the  lower  parts  of  the  field,  greatly  impeding  the 
preparations  of  each  commander.  For  an  hour  or  two  after 
daylight  there  were  few  indications  of  the  terrific  scenes  which 
were  to  be  crowded  into  that  Sabbath  day. 

Both  sides  had  improved  the  night  to  rectify  and  strengthen 
the  alignment.  Bragg  had  received  important  re-enforce 
ments.  General  Longstreet  arrived  in  the  night  and  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  left  wing.  Polk  was  assigned  to 
the  right  wing.  With  Longstreet  came  the  bulk  of  his  two 
divisions  from  Virginia,  Hood  and  McLaws.  Three  brigades 
only  of  the  former  had  taken  part  with  Hood  in  the  first  day's 
fight.  Gist's  brigade  of  Walker's  corps  also  arrived  from 
Meridian.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  with  all  the  warn 
ings  and  requests  of  Rosecrans  to  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington,  had  done  nothing  to  prevent  a  general  .exodus  of 
rebel  forces  from  Mississippi.  Even  a  portion  of  Pemberton's 
paroled  men  came,  and  two  brigades,  relieved  by  paroled 
prisoners,  were  in  time  for  the  first  day's  battle.  Bragg  re 
adjusted  his  lines  during  the  night.  The  most  important 
change  was  to  bring  Breckinridge  from  his  extreme  left,  east 
of  the  Chickamauga,  to  the  extreme  right.  Cleburne  and 
Cheatham  were  both  moved  close  to  Breckinridge.  Forrest, 
with  two  divisions,  one  to  fight  on  foot,  was  placed  still  to 
the  right  of  Breckrinridge,  to  observe  the  Lafayette  road. 
With  this  heavy  force,  strengthened  on  its  extreme  left  with 
Stewart,  he  intended  to  attack  the  Union  left  at  daylight. 

Rosecrans,  on  the  other  hand,  had  no  re-enforcements  with 
which  to  relieve  or  help  his  lines,  and  most  of  his  army  had 
marched  a  night  and  fought  a  day  without  rest  and  with  little 
food,  and  every  available  man  had  been  engaged.  Burnside 
had  been  for  weeks  where  he  could  easily  have  formed  a  junc 
tion.  In  fact,  slowly  as  he  had  moved,  his  infantry  had 
reached  Kingston  about  the  time  Rosecrans  had  finished  con 
centrating  his  army.  It  was  the  duty  and  the  business  of 
Halleck  and  others  at  Washington  to  have  had  it  on  the  field 
for  the  first  day's  battle. 

It  was  grim  business  for  this  contracted  line  of  Union 
heroes  to  face  the  eleven  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  of 


CHICKAMAUGA— SECOND  DAY'S  BATTLE. 


35 

cavalry,  one  of  the  latter  fighting  as  infantry,  which  Bragg 
had  before  them.  Their  only  advantage  was  in  their  shorter 
lines  and  the  fact  that  it  was  necessary  for  Bragg  to  attack, 
while  for  the  most  part  they  could  remain  on  the  defensive. 
They  were  besides  in  excellent  spirits  and  confident  of  their 
powers. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  rearrangement  of  the 
Union  line.  Beginning  on  the  left,  which  covered  Bragg's 
objective — namely,  the  control  of  the  Lafayette  road  to  Chat 
tanooga— -Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and  Reynolds  were  with 
drawn  slightly  from  the  ground  on  which  they  had  fought 
the  day  before,  and  placed  in  strong  position  in  the  edge  of 
the  woods  which  skirted  the  Kelly  farm.  Brannan  remained 
near  the  position  to  which  he  had  been  called  to  support  Rey 
nolds  the  night  before.  The  divisions  of  Negley,  Wood, 
Davis,  and  Sheridan  arid  the  brigade  of  Wilder  had  all  been 
drawn  back  of  the  Lafayette  road,  their  lines  being  slightly 
advanced  from  the  road,  leading  from  Crawfish  Springs  to 
the  Layfayette  road  at  Kelly's  farm. 

The  order  of  the  Confederate  line  from  its  right  to  a  point 
in  front  of  Brannan's  has  already  been  stated.  Here  Stewart, 
of  Buckner's  corps,  formed  the  right  of  Longstreet,  who  com 
manded  the  left  wing,  and,  counting  toward  the  enemy's 
left,  the  succeeding  divisions  were  Bushrod  Johnson,  with 
Law  and  Kershaw  in  reserve,  Hindman  and  Preston  Buck 
ner's  corps  was  present  with  this  wing  by  the  courtesy  of 
Burnside  and  the  Washington  authorities,  while  the  latter 
alone  were  responsible  for  the  inaction  at  the  East  which 
allowed  Longstreets  corps  to  be  present.  By  the  same  court 
esy  Walker's  division  from  Mississippi  was  present  with 
Hill's  corps,  and  was  to  fight  again,  splendidly  but  unsuccess 
fully,  on  Bragg's  right,  as  it  had  all  the  day  before. 

Under  cover  the  tog  in  the  shelter  of  the  woods,  and  in 
the  plainful  quiet  of  that  Sabbath  morning,  the  two  armies 
had  brought  their  lines  face  to  face.  At  9  o'clock  there  was 
scarcely  any  point  the  length  of  a  tiger's  spring  between 
them. 

Bragg  had  212  regiments,  organized  into  42  brigades,  and 
these  in  7  divisions.  There  were  in  all  173  infantry  regi 
ments  and  11  of  cavalry,  which  were  dismounted  and  fought 
as  infantry,  28  cavalry  regiments  and  50  batteries.  Rose- 
crans  had  158  regiments,  33  brigades,  14  divisions,  and  5 
corps.  There  were  141  regiments  of  infantry  and  18  of  cav 
alry  and  36  batteries. 

Of  Bragg's  corps  two  were  cavalry — Wheeler  and  Forrest. 
One  division  of  Forrest's  fought  as  infantry.  Rosecrans  had 
one  cavalry  corps  of  two  divisions.  This  tremendous  array 


36 

was  pushed  close  against  a  Union  front  of  only  two  miles  and 
a  half. 

At  9  o'clock  that  Sabbath  service  of  all  the  gods  of  war 
began.  It  broke  full-toned  with  its  infernal  music  over  the 
Union  left,  and  that  morning  service  continued  there  till 
noon. 

Let  us  look  a  moment  at  the  Union  line.  John  Beatty's 
brigade  had  been  stretched  as  a  thin  line  from  Baird's  left 
to  the  Lafayette  road  and  across  it.  King's  regulars  formed 
the  left  of  Baird,  Scribner  his  center,  and  Starkweather  his 
right.  He  had  no  reserve.  Johnston's  division  was  on  the 
right  of  Baird;  Dodge  and  Baldwin,  of  his  brigades,  on  the 
front,  and  Willich  in  reserve.  Next  was  Palmer,  with  Cruft 
and  Hazen  on  the  line,  and  Grose  in  reserve.  Reynolds,  on 
Palmer's  right,  reached  the  Lafayette  road  again.  He  had 
Turchin  in  line  and  King  in  reserve.  The  Union  line  was 
protected  by  log  barricades.  It  thus  ran  around  the  Kelley 
farm  and  was  established  from  fifty  to  a  hundred  yards  within 
the  woods  which  skirted  the  great  open  space  in  their 
rear.  This  field,  which  lay  along  the  State  road  for  half  a 
mile  and  was  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  became  the  scene  of 
almost  continuous  and  ever  brilliant  fighting.  Beside  the 
great  battle  along  the  main  lines  surrounding  it,  there  were 
during  the  day  five  distinct  brigade  charges  over  it,  one  of 
Stanley,  one  of  Van  Deveer.  one  of  Grose,  a  fourth  by  Wil 
lich,  and  a  fifth  by  Turchin. 

Bragg 's  orders  were  to  attack  successively  by  divisions, 
from  right  to  left.  Breckenridge  struck  first.  He  came  on 
in  single  line,  swinging  around  towards  the  State  road  to 
gain  Baird's  rear.  Adams  was  on  his  right,  Stovall  in  the 
center,  and  Helm  on  the  left.  This  latter  brigade  struck 
Scribner's  breastworks,  and  was  instantly  shattered  there. 
Helm  rode  bravely  among  his  troops,  enthusiastically  urging 
them  forward,  and  fell  dead  while  thus  engaged.  Two  of 
his  colonels  were  killed,  and  two  were  wounded. 

Stovall  pushed  in  with  dauntless  pluck  against  the  regu 
lars  on  the  left  of  Scribner,  but  King's  men  fought  splen 
didly.  The  rebels  assaulted  bravely  but  uselessly.  Adams 
had  swept  in  on  John  Beatty's  thin  line,  and  broken  it. 
Still  itfought  with  undaunted  courage,  yielding  doggedly,  and 
by  the  inch,  and  finally  Adams,  retarded  by  the  disaster  on 
his  left,  was  at  bay.  At  this  juncture  came  Stanley's  brigade, 
from  Negley,  near  the  center,  with  deployed  lines,  and  the 
sun  on  its  banners.  It  swept  over  the  Kelly  field,  from 
near  the  house,  and  plunged  into  the  woods  in  the  rear  of 
Beatty.  Well  might  those  who  were  witnessing  that  threat 
ening  move  toward  the  Union  rear  hold  their  breaths  as 


37 

Stanley  disappeared,  and  thus  wait  for  his  volleys  and  their 
effect.  In  a  moment  they  came,  then  his  rattling  line  fire, 
then  the  cheer  of  a  charge.  The  first  attack  of  Breckenridge 
had  ended  in  a  sore  defeat. 

But  Clehurne  had  in  turn  advanced.  He,  like  Breckin- 
ridge,  came  in  single  line.  Polk,  of  Cleburne,  assaulted 
Starkweather's  front,  while  Wood  of  the  same  command  ex 
tended  the  attack  as  far  as  the  right  of  Baldwin.  The  rem 
nants  of  Helm,  under  Colonel  Lewis,  still  assisted  against 
Scribner,  hut  soon  Cleburne's  division  was  repelled  at  every 
point  with  terrible  loss.  The  Confederate  officers  engaged 
describe  the  effect  of  the  Union  artillery  throughout  this  at 
tack  as  the  most  destructive  in  their  experience.  Thus 
Bragg's  first  attack  had  wholly  failed.  The  Union  forces 
were  exultant,  and  so  strong  were  their  skirmish  demonstra 
tions  that  Hill,  who  was  under  orders  to  organize  a  second 
and  much  stronger  attack,  paused  to  first  prepare  his  own 
lines  against  assault. 

Walker's  reserve  corps  of  two  divisions  was  brought  up, 
and  its  five  brigades  distributed  along  the  shattered  points 
of  Breckenridge' s  and  Cleburne's  lines.  The  organizations 
of  rebel  divisions  being  thus  destroyed,  the  attack  became 
largely  one  of  brigades  acting  independently,  each  rushing 
at  the  Union  works.  There  were  ten  rebel  brigades  engaged 
in  the  movement  from  the  Union  left  to  Palmer's  position, 
and  beyond  this  point  Stewart's  division  co-operated  by  as 
saulting  Reynold's  narrow  front  and  Brannan's  lines. 
Wood,  of  Cleburne,  who  had  previously  stormed  the  angle 
of  the  Union  works  on  Johnson's  right  and  been  repulsed, 
assisted  by  Deshler,  of  the  same  division,  thinking  this  angle 
the  flank  of  the  barricades,  again  struck  obliquely  and  with 
fury  with  the  idea  of  turning  them.  Instead,  these  dashing 
Confederates  went  to  pieces  on  Baldwin's  brigade,  of  Johnson, 
and  on  Palmer's  front.  Walthall  assaulted  the  corresponding 
angle  at  Scribner's  position,  and  though  he  carried  his  men 
within  pistol  range  of  the  crests,  he  wa^  beaten  back  with 
heavy  loss.  Gist,  acting  with  Helm's  (now  Lewis')  broken 
line,  attacked  with  power,  but  in  turn  was  driven  back.  Col- 
quitt,  still  further  to  the  right,  came  upon  the  regular  brig 
ade  of  King.  But  his  line  had  missed  direction,  and  was  at 
onceexposed  to  a'withering  flank  fire,  and  overwhelmed.  Col- 
quitt  fell.  Several  of  his  most  prominent  officers  were  killed. 
Ector  and  Wilson,  of  Walker's  second  division  (Liddell's), 
advanced  to  help,  but  without  effect.  Govan,  however,  of  this 
same  division ,  was  successful ,  and  by  hot  fightin  g  and  the  weight 
of  numbers,  he  bore  back  John  Beatty's  weakened  line^and 
the  situation  on  the  Union  left  became  at 'once  most  serious. 


38 

Everything  but  this  along  the  line  of  the  second  attack  hy 
Bragg's  right  had  failed.  It  began  to  look  as  if  rebel  victory 
was  dawning  here,  and  that  the  triumph  of  Bragg's  plan  of 
turning  the  Union  left  had  come. 

For  Breckinridge,  in  the  second  advance,  had  swung  his 
lines  much  farther  to  his  right,  and  by  a  wide  left  wheel  had 
brought  his  right  across  the  State  road,  and  so  between  the 
Union  left  and  Rossville  His  left  reached  and  slightly  over 
lapped  Beatty's  left.  Thus  formed  with  lines  perpendicular 
to  the  State  road,  he  began  a  march  directly  toward  the 
Kelly  house  and  the  rear  of  Reynolds,  just  beyond  it. 
While  the  remnants  of  the  left,  so  badly  broken,  first  under 
Helm  and  then  under  his  successor,  were  entangled  with 
Beatty  and  Stanley,  his  two  other  brigades,  Adams  on  the 
right  and  Stoval  to  the  left,  burst  out  of  the  woods  on  the 
noth  side  of  the  Kelly  field,  quickly  rectified  their  lines, 
threw  out  a  heavy  skirmish  force,  and  bore  rapidly  down 
toward  Reynolds.  It  was  half  a  mile  to  his  position  over 
smooth  and  open  ground.  From  the  start  the  skirmishers 
could  throw  their  bullets  into  Reynolds  rear.  It  was  a 
movement  threatening  dire  disaster.  The  moment  it  devel 
oped  in  the  rear  of  Baird,  Walker's  corps  and  Cleburne's 
brigades  reopened  their  fire  on  the  front  of  the  barricades, 
while  Stewart  advanced  on  Reynolds  and  Brannau.  Thus, 
taken  on  flank,  front,  and  full  in  the  rear,  and  outnumbered 
at  every  point,  it  seemed  as  if  there  was  no  salvation  for  the 
Union  left.  But  it  came,  and  at  that  point  where  Confed 
erate  victory  seemed  sure,  full  defeat  fell  suddenly  upon 
them.  Thomas  watching  the  progress  of  Breckinridge's 
flank  attack,  had  sent  to  Rosecrans  for  Brannan.  At  that 
moment  the  battle  had  not  extended  to  the  latter.  But  just 
as  Rosecrans'  order  to  go  to  Thomas  reached  Brannan  signs 
of  heavy  and  immediate  attack  on  his  front  became  apparent 
He  well  used  his  discretion,  and  remained  on  the  line  until 
he  could  report  the  situation  to  Rosecrans.  But  in  the 
mean  time,  in  partial  compliance  with  the  order,  he  sent 
Fred  Van  Derveer's  brigade,  which  constituted  his  reserve, 
to  the  help  of  the  left.  This  brigade  deployed,  marched 
rapidly,  in  to  line  toward  the  Kelly  house,  and  came  into 
the  field  less  than  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  Breckin- 
ridge's  line.  Though  presenting  its  flank  to  the  enemy 
when  he  was  first  discovered,  it  changed  front  in  the  open 
ground  under  fire,  charged  the  rebel  line,  broke  it,  following 
it  back  into  the  woods,  and  after  an  hours'  fighting  drove 
these  two  brigades  with  their  artillery  entirely  clear  of  the 
Union  left.  It  then  returned  to  a  point  near  the  Kelly 
house. 


39 

Govan,  of  Walker,  next  on  the  left  of  Breckinridge,  had, 
however,  gained  a  lodgment  on  the  line  which  Beatty  had 
so  stubbornly  held.  Then  came  another  Union  charge  over 
the  Kelly  field.  Palmer,  under  Thomas's  orders,  sent 
Grose  with  his  reserve  brigade  to  clear  Baird's  immediate 
left.  Moving  from  the  edge  of  the  woods  back  into  the  open 
field,  Grose  formed  in  double  lines,  moved  at  double-quick 
across  the  rear  of  Johnson  and  Baird,  and  rushed  with 
cheers  into  the  woods  on  the  north  side  of  the  field.  In  a 
few  moments  his  volleys  were  pouring  into  the  face  of  Govan. 
The  latter 's  troops  fought  desperately,  but  their  supports  on 
each  flank  had  been  previously  broken,  and  soon,  after  bit 
ter  loss,  gave  way.  The  Union  left  was  then  further 
strengthened  by  placing  Barries,  of  Van  Cleve,  on  the  left  of 
Beatty.  It  was  then  noon.  So  badly  shattered  was  Bragg's 
right  that  it  was  nearly  5  o'clock  before  another  attack 
could  be  organized  on  this  ground.  Thenceforth  the  Union 
left  was  safe. 

Simultaneously  with  the  appearance  of  Breckinridge  in 
the  Kelly  field  events  were  hastening  to  an  appalling  con 
summation  on  the  Union  center.  Stewart,  the  right  of 
Longstreet's  wing,  moved  to  the  assault  in  Reynold's  front. 
With  three  brigades  he  rushed  upon  Turchin,  who  formed 
Reynold's  advance,  and  Hazen,  of  Palmer,  next  on  the  left, 
while  his  left  also  involved  Brannan's  left.  On  his  right  he 
also  had  the  co-operation  of  Wood's  and  Deshlers  brigades, 
of  Cleburne.  Deshler  was  killed  as  the  movement  began, 
and  Roger  Q.  Mills,  of  Texas,  succeeded  him. 

As  this  was  the  opening  of  the  memorable  attack  which 
led  to  the  break  in  the  Union  center  it  is  worthy  of  close  at 
tention.  General  Stewart,  in  his  report,  thus  describes  it : 

"  For  several  hundred  yards  both  lines  pressed  on  under 
the  most  terrific  fire  it  has  ever  been  my  fortune  to  witness. 
The  enemy  retired,  and  our  men,  though  mowed  down  at 
every  step,  rushed  on  at  double-quick,  until  at  length  the 
brigade  on  the  right  of  Brown  broke  in  confusion,  exposing 
him  to  an  enfilading  fire.  He  continued  on,  however,  some 
fifty  to  seventy-five  yards  further,  when  his  two  right  regi 
ments  gave  way  in  disorder  and  retired  to  their  original  po 
sition.  His  center  and  left,  however,  followed  by  the  gal 
lant  Clayton  and  indomitable  Bate,  pressed  on,  passing  the 
cornfield  in  front  of  the  burnt  house,  and  to  a  distance  of 
two  hundred  to  three  hundred  yards  beyond  the  Chattanooga 
road,  driving  the  enemy  within  his  line  of  intrenchments 
and  passing  a  battery  of  four  guns,  which  were  afterward 
taken  possession  of  by  a  regiment  from  another  division. 
Here  new  batteries  being  opened  by  the  enemy  on  our  front 


40 

and  flank,  heavily  supported  by  infantry,  it  became  necessary 
to  retire,  the  command  reforming  on  the  ground  occupied  be 
fore  the  advance." 

All  this  was  going  on  in  the  front  of  Reynolds  and  Palmer, 
while  Brechinridge,  as  already  described,  was  entering  the 
open  field  from  the  north  in  plain  sight  from  their  rear.  Yet 
not  a  single  Union  soldier  left  the- line.  Standing  steadfast, 
they  first  resisted,  as  Stewart  describes,  and  then  were  in 
cited  to  still  greater  action  by  the  brilliant  fighting  of  Van 
Derveer  in  their  rear,  which  so  unexpectly  brought  them  the 
much-needed  relief. 

Here  the  story  reaches  the  event  of  the  break  in  the  Union 
lines,  which  is  widely  misunderstood,  and  has  been  most  un 
justly  used  to  throw  discredit  on  General  Kosecrans.  Just 
as  Longstreet's  attack  was  developing  upon  Wood's  front, 
the  latter  received  an  order  from  General  Rosecrans  to 
11  close  upon  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible  and  support  him." 
As  Brannan  was  between  himself  and  Reynolds,  Wood  saw 
no  other  way  of  executing  the  order,  which  he  deemed  im 
perative,  except  to  withdraw  from  line,  and  pass  to  the  rear 
of  Brannan.  This  he  did,  although  the  attack  was  just 
bursting  on  his  front. 

It  has  been  persistently  claimed,  to  General  Rosecrans's 
detrimeat,  that  in  the  excitement  of  the  height  of  battle  he 
had  issued  a  blundering  order.  Nothing  could  be  more  un 
just.  The  explanation  is  perfectly  simple.  General  Thomas 
had  sent  for  Brannan  to  meet  Breckinridge's  flank  attack. 
Stewart's  attack  had  struck  Reynolds  with  force  and  was 
rapidly  developing  on  Brannan's  front.  The  latter  hastily 
consulted  with  Reynolds  as  to  the  propriety  of  withdrawing, 
and  both  being  clear  that  to  obey  the  order  would  open  the 
line  to  the  enemy,  Brannan  dispatched  Van  Derveer,  his  re 
serve,  to  the  left,  in  partial  compliance  with  its  terms,  and 
then  reported  to  Rosecrans  that  he  had  deemed  it  vitally  im 
portant  to  maintain  his  line  till  the  commanding  officer 
could  be  advised  of  the  situation.  He  instantly  approved 
Brannan's  action.  But  just  before  his  message  arrived, 
upon  the  supposition  that  he  had  obeyed  the  order  and  gone 
to  Thomas,  the  noted  order  to  Wood  to  close  to  the  left  on 
Reynolds  had  been  dispatched.  When  it  reached  Wood,  the 
attack,  rolling  along  Branran's  front,  had  reached  his  own. 
Had  he  exercised  the  same  discretion  which  Brannan  had  so 
wisely  displayed,  all  would  have  been  well,  and  that  nearly 
fatal  break  in  the  Union  lines  would  not  have  occured.  But 
instantly  on  reading  it,  Wood  rapidly  withdrew  his  division 
and  started  in  the  rear  of  Brannan  toward  Reynolds.  Long- 
street,  who  had  waited  most  impatiently  till  11  o'clock  be- 


41 

fore  be  could  move  a  man  to  the  attack,  had  solidified  his 
lines  before  the  Union  center  and  left,  and  the  moment 
Wood  left  this  wide  gap  for  him,  Longstreet  thrust  into  it 
the  eight  brigades  of  his  central  column  of  attack.  They 
were  formed  in  three  lines,  and  advancing  rapidly  they 
opened  on  Brannan's  right  and  rear  and  Davis'  left,  and 
greatly  widened  the  gap.  Brannan  threw  back  his  right, 
losing  something  from  Council's  brigade  on  that  flank,  but, 
stubbornly  resisting  Longstreet's  advance  as  he  retired  that 
wing  of  his  division,  he  soon  re-established  it  on  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  near  the  Snodgrass  House,  on  a  line  nearly  perpen 
dicular  to  the  one  he  had  occupied  when  Longstreet  pushed 
through  the  gap  left  by  wood.  The  latter  had  passed  rap 
idly  to  the  rear  of  Brannan,  and  though  subjected  to  heavy 
attack  after  passing  Brannan's  left,  he  was  able  to.  establish 
his  line  on  a  lower  ridge  in  the  prolongation  of  Brannan's 
new  position,  and  reaching  in  the  direction  of  Reynolds. 
The  latter  officer  soon  retired  his  right  slightly,  and  the  line 
was  again  continuous,  except  a  break  between  Wood  and  Rey 
nolds,  from  Brannan's  right  to  Barnes  on  Baird's  left. 
Into  this  vacant  space  Hazen  moved  later  under  orders  from 
Thomas,  and  then  the  line  on  that  part  of  the  field  was 
firmly  established. 

All  to  the  right  of  Brannan  had  gone.  Negley,  with  one 
brigade  of  his  division,  which  was  caught  in  the  gap,  had 
drifted  toward  Brannan.  Here,  gathering  up  much  artillery, 
which  he  was  ordered  by  Thomas  to  post  on  the  crest  over 
looking  the  field  in  front  of  Baird's  left,  he  took  it  instead  to 
Brannan's  right,  and  soon,  without  waiting  to  be  attacked 
in  his  strong  position,  and  although  he  had  promised  Bran- 
nan  to  hold  it,  abandoned  it,  and  retired  in  haste  toward  Ross- 
ville,  ordering  all  the  artillery  to  follow  him. 

Davis  had  moved  rapidly  into  the  breastworks  which  Neg 
ley  had  occupied,  and  there  placed  his  weak  force  of  two 
brigades  across  Longstreet's  advance.  But  after  his  terrific 
fighting  of  the  day  before  he  ha,d  only  twelve  hundred  men  for 
action,  and  though  Carlin.  and  Heg's  men  under  Martin, 
fought  with  desperation,  they  could  do  nothing  but  yield. 
They  were  driven  in  disorder  to  the  right  and  rear. 

At  the  same  time  Van  Cleve,  with  his  two  remaining 
brigades  in  motion  towards  Thomas,  was  thrown  into  great 
disorder,  through  a  considerable  portion  of  them  rallied  with 
Wood. 

As  Davis  was  borne  back,  McCook,  of  the  Twentieth  Corps, 
in  person  led  Laibolt's  brigade,  of  Sheridan's  division, 
against  Longstreets'  advancing  columns.  The  attack  was 
delivered  with  spirit  and  power,  but  it  failed  in  the  face  of 


42 

overwhelming  numbers,  and  the  brigade  was  utterly  routed. 
McCook  was  carried  to  the  rear  with  it. 

Next  came  Sheridan,  with  his  two  remaining  brigades  un 
der  Lytle  and  Bradley.  The  former,  with  splendid  bearing 
and  courage,  rallied  his  columns,  and  though  they  were  taken 
at  every  disadvantage,  under  the  inspiration  which  he  im 
parted  they  faced  the  resistless  advance  with  desperate  valor. 
Lytle  fell  where  death  was  thickest  for  his  comrades.  His 
brigade,  and  that  of  Bradley,  with  Wilder,  who  had  also 
fought  to  the  extremity  to  assist,  were  all  borne  to  the  rear 
and  forced  to  join  the  fugitive  columns  falling  off  from  the 
Union  right  toward  Rossville.  General  Rosecrans  had  just 
ridden  the  lines  from  the  left,  and  had  passed  in  the  rear  of 
McCook's  position,  when  the  line  was  severed.  Finding  the 
roads  in  rear  of  the  right  filled  with  retreating  columns  rep 
resenting  all  corps  of  the  army,  for  Negley  was  there  from 
Thomas,  he  deemed  it  prudent  to  ride  to  Chattanooga  and 
decide  upon  a  new  position  in  front  of  the  place.  General 
Crittenden's  whole  command,  that  is,  three  divisions,  having 
been  ordered  in  succession  to  Thomas  before  the  break,  Crit- 
tenden  himself,  being  without  command,  rode  into  Chatta 
nooga  after  Rosecrans,  as  did  also  McCook.  Sheridan's  divis 
ion  was  in  good  order  by  the  time  it  reached  Rossville,  and 
most  of  the  troops  which  left  the  field  were  about  that  place 
and  McFarland's  Gap  in  fighting  condition  throughout  the 
afternoon.  Their  numbers  at  2  o'clock  were  from  seven  to 
ten  thousand.  They  could  easily  have  been  led  to  Baird's 
left  or  Brannan's  right,  as  the  way  to  either  flank  was  open. 
This  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  General  Garfield,  Colonel 
Gates  Thurston,  and  Surgeons  Gross  and  Perkins,  the  medi 
cal  directors  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps,  rode 
back  and  joined  General  Thomas.  It  is  one  of  the  myths  of 
current  Chickamauga  history  that  Sheridan  marched  with  his 
division  back  to  the  fighting  line,  but  this  is  an  error.  He 
received  a  request  at  McFarland's  Gap  from  Gen.  Thomas 
to  return  to  the  field,  but  decided  instead  to  retire  to  Ross 
ville.  Upon  reaching  the  latter  point  he  moved  out  on  the 
Lafayette  road  toward  Gen.  Thomas,  but  did  not  form  a 
junction  with  him.  He  reached  the  Cloud  House  at  7  p.  m. 
and  soon  after  withdrew  to  Rossville. 

Six  Confederate  divisions  under  Longstreet  had  taken  part  in 
breaking  the  Union  center  and  sweeping  its  right  off  the  field. 
These  were  Stewart,  Bushrod  Johnson,  and  Preston,  of 
Buckner's  corps  :  Hood  and  McLaws,  of  Longstreet's  Vir 
ginia  troops,  and  Hindman's  division  of  Polk's  corps.  Eight 
brigades  of  this  force  had  first  entered  the  gap  left  by  Wood, 
and  from  that  time  till  Rosecrans,  McCook,  Crittenden,  and 


>/  xx'    \SNODG-R AS$ 


42a 


KELLEY'S  FARM-HORSESHOE  RIDGE. 


43 

Sheridan  had  gone,  and  Brannan  had  established  himself  on 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  each  of  these  six  divisions  had  advanced 
and  fought  with  vigor.  Finally  Hindman,  finding  no  re 
sistance  on  his  left,  wheeled  to  the  right  to  assist  Longstreet's 
center  and  right,  which  had  been  checked  by  Brannan  and 
Wood.  This  brought  Longstreet's  six  divisions  together  in 
the  vicinity  of  Horseshoe  ridge. 

Shortly  after  2  o'clock  Longstreet  ordered  a  general  as 
sault  by  his  wing.  It  was  delivered  with  confidence  and 
tremendous  power.  To  meet  these  six  divisions  Brannan  on 
the  right  had  Croxton's  brigade  and  part  of  Council's  ;  Wood, 
on  the  left,  had  Harker's  brigade.  With  these  organized 
commands  were  a  part  of  John  Beatty's,  a  good  part  of  Stan 
ley's  and  the  Twenty-first  Ohio,  of  Sirwell's,  all  of  Negley  ; 
parts  of  the  Ninth  and  the  Seventeenth  Kentucky  ;  Forty- 
fourth  Indiana  and  Thirteenth  Ohio,  of  Van  Cleve's  divis 
ion,  with  the  Fifty-eighth  Indiana,  of  Buell's  brigade — in 
all  about  4,000  men. 

Against  this  line,  hastily  formed  and  without  reserves, 
Longstreet  launched  his  solid  columns.  They  came  on  mag 
nificently,  wave  behind  wave.  They  met  sheeted  fire  from 
the  summits,  and  yet  pressed  on  to  hand  encounters,  but  from 
these  they  soon  recoiled.  The  whole  line  retired  from  the 
foot  of  the  slopes,  and  covered  by  the  forests  organized  for  a 
second  attack.  It  was  delivered  soon  after  3  o'clock.  Like 
the  first,  it  fell  on  the  fronts  of  Wood  and  Brannan.  But 
while  Hindman  assaulted  the  latter  in  front  he  also  sent 
a  brigade  through  the  gap  to  Brannan's  right  to  scale 
the  ridge  and  gain  his  rear.  Negley,  who  had  held  this 
point  with  abundant  artillery  and  infantry  supports,  and 
who  had  promised  to  stay  there,  had  promptly  fled  before 
any  attack  had  reached  him  and  was  even  then  in  Rossville. 
There  was  absolutely  nothing  to  send  against  Hindman's 
left,  towering  there  with  its  fringe  of  bayonets  on  the  com 
manding  ridge,  and  forming  to  sweep  down  on  Brannan's 
right  and  rear.  Longstreet  and  all  his  general  officers  were 
exultant,  and  though  their  second  attack  had  failed  every 
where,  except  as  this  lodgment  was  obtained  on  the  ridge 
beyond  Brannan,  they  rapidly  arranged  their  lines  for  what 
they  believed  would  be  a  final  assanlt  leading  to  sure  victory. 

But  not  a  Union  soldier  moved  from  his  place.  The  men 
clutched  their  guns  tighter.  Officers  everywhere  moved 
closer  to  the  lines  to  encourage  and  steady  them.  The  color- 
bearers  set  their  flags  firmer.  And  then,  as  if  to  repay  such 
courage,  help  came  as  unexpectedly  as  if  the  hand  of  the 
Lord  had  been  visibly  extended  to  save.  Suddenly  a  Union 
column  appeared,  moving  with  speed  across  the  fields  from 


44 

the  direction  of  the  McDaniel  house.  It  was  Granger,  of  the 
reserve,  with  two  brigades  of  Steedman's  division.  Being 
stationed  four  miles  away  toward  Ringgold,  Granger,  agree 
ing  with  Steedman  that  they  must  be  sorely  needed  on  the 
field,  had  started  without  orders,  and  though  shelled  by 
Forrest  on  his  flank  for  two  miles  of  the  way,  had  not  al 
lowed  his  columns  to  be  greatly  delayed.  And  now  Steed 
man  was  sweeping  up  to  the  foot  of  the  hill  below  the  Snod- 
grass  House.  As  he  reported  to  Thomas,  coming  in  from 
toward  the  Kelly  farm  was  another  well-ordered  column. 
It  proved  to  be  Van  Derveer  returning  from  the  charge  upon 
Breckenridge  in  the  Kelly  field.  The  map  shows  how  he 
had  left  Brannan's  line  just  before  the  break  and  hastened 
with  deployed  lines  toward  the  left ;  how  thus  deployed  he 
had  marched  from  the  woods  to  be  enfiladed  from  Breckin- 
ridge's  front  as  the  latter  emerged  from  the  woods  and  burst 
upon  the  Union  rear.  Here,  under  this  fire,  he  whirled  his 
brigade  to  the  left,  delivered  a  full  volley  at  pistol  range 
into  the  enemy's  faces,  charged  into  their  lines  on  a  run, 
drore  them  back  on  their  batteries,  and  pursued  both  infantry 
and  artillery  to  a  point  beyond  the  Union  left,  where  Grose, 
coming  from  the  rear  of  Palmer,  completed  the  work.  The 
dotted  line  shows  Van  Derveer's  return.  He,  too,  had  moved 
without  orders  to  the  sound  of  tremendous  firing  about  the 
Snodgrass  house.  Just  as  Steedman  had  hastily  formed  and 
assaulted  Hindman's  forces  beyond  the  right  of  Brannan,  Van 
Derveer  joined  his  brigade  to  Steedman's  left  and  moved  also 
to  the  assault.  Steedman  seized  a  regimental  flag  and  rode 
with  it  in  his  hands  to  the  top.  His  command  was  the  bri 
gades  of  those  splendid  soldiers,  John  G.  Mitchell  and 
Walter  C.  Whittaker. 

One  (Whittaker's)  plunged  into  the  gorge  through  which 
Hindman's  left  was  pouring,  the  rest  of  the  line,  with  Van 
Derveer  on  its  left,  charged  for  the  ridge.  In  twenty  minutes 
it  was  carried  and  all  of  Hindman's  forces  were  driven  from 
it  and  out  of  the  ravine.  Whittaker  had  been  wounded  and 
four  of  his  five  staff  officers  either  killed  or  mortally  wounded. 
One-fifth  of  Steedman's  force  had  been  disabled  in  the  charge. 
Van  Derveer" s  loss  was  considerable,  but  less  in  proportion, 
as  he  was  not  fairly  in  front  of  Hindman,  as  Steedman  was. 
Twice  Hindman  turned  his  recoiling  troops  to  recapture  the 
position,  but  finally  abandoned  the  effort  and  relinquished 
the  ridge  to  Steedman.  The  center  and  right  of  Longstreet'8 
third  assault  was  in  like  manner  repelled.  In  this  move 
ment  the  Fourth  Kentucky,  Col.  R.  M.  Kelley,  joined  Van 
Derveer  and  fought  with  him  till  night. 


45 

The  coming  of  Steedman  was  more  than  an  inspiration.  It 
was  more  than  the  holdingof  the  right.  He  brought  100,000 
rounds  of  cartridges  and  artillery  ammunition — far  more 
welcome  than  diamonds.  Regiments  in  the  line  had  been 
fighting,  even  at  thatearly  hour,  with  the  bayonet  and  clubbed 
muskets.  Now,  wben  Longstreet's  right  came  on  in  aid  of 
the  attempt  of  Hindman  to  bold  bis  position  on  the  west 
they  were  received  with  terrific  and  continuing  fire,  and  as 
the  lines  of  gray,  with  desperate  valor,  neared  the  summit 
Wood's  men  and  Brannan's  rushed,  at  them  with  the  bayonet 
and  broke  their  ranks,  rolled  them  down  the  slopes,  and  on 
WoocP s  front,  with  help  of  a  direct  fire  from  Aleshire's 
battery  on  the  left  and  a  terrible  enfilading  fire  from  Battery 
I,  Fourth  Regular  Artillery,  on  Brannan's  left,  under  those 
splendid  young  soldiers,  Lieutenants  Frank  Gr.  Smith  and 
George  B.  Rodney,  drove  them  in  disorder  beyond  their 
artillery. 

At  this  time  both  Confederate  wings  were  calling  for  re- 
enforcements.  Bragg's  reply  to  Longstreet  was  that  the 
right  was  so  badly  shattered  that  it  could  not  help  him. 

When  Steedman's  coming  with  four  thousand  men  had  so 
changed  the  whole  current  of  the  battle,  what  if  the  seven 
thousand  men  under  Sheridan  and  Negley  about  McFarland's 
and  Rossville,  much  nearer  than  Steedman  was,  had  been 
brought  up  ?  How  the  officers  who  were  there  could  stay 
themselves,  or  manage  to  keep  the  men,  is  a  mystery  sick 
ening  to  think  about. 

Hindman  thus  tells  of  the  attack  by  which  he  carried  the 
ridge  to  the  right  of  Brannan,  before  Steedman  arrived  : 

"In  a  few  minutes  a  terrific  contest  ensued,  which  con 
tinued,  at  close  quarters,  without  any  intermission,  over  four 
hours.  Our  troops  attacked  again  and  again  with  a  courage 
worthy  of  their  past  achievements.  The  enemy  fought  with 
determined  obstinacy  and  repeatedly  repulsed  us,  but  only  to 
be  again  assailed.  As  showing  the  fierceness  of  the  fight, 
the  fact  is  mentioned  that*  on  our  extreme  left  the  bayonet 
was  used  and  men  were  also  killed  and  wounded  with  clubbed 
muskets." 

Of  the  attack  of  Steedman's  men  in  the  ravine,  where  they 
rushed  on  the  Confederate  line  with  the  bayonet,  pushed  in 
among  the  guns  and  killed  gunners  at  their  posts,  Hindman 
further  says  :  "I  have  never  known  Federal  troops  to  fight 
so  well.  It  is  just  to  say,  also,  that  I  never  saw  Confederate 
soldiers  fight  better."  Of  the  second  attack  upon  Brannan's 
position,  which  was  repulsed,  Kershaw,  commanding  in 
Longstreet's  troops  from  Virginia,  said:  "  This  was  one  of 
the  heaviest  attacks  of  the  war  on  a  single  point." 


46 

Up  to  the  time  of  Steedman's  arrival  there  had  been  a 
break  between  Reynolds  and  Wood,  but  the  flank  of  the 
former  in  advance  of  the  latter  somewhat  covered  it.  Upon 
this  point  Longstreet  now  organized  a  heavy  attack.  But 
the  lull  on  the  left,  arising  from  the  rebels  there  having  been, 
as  Bragg  expressed  it,  "  so  badly  beaten  back"  that  they 
could  be  of  no  service  on  his  left,  made  it  practicable  to 
strengthen  the  Union  center.  Hazen  was  found  to  have  am 
munition,  and  was  moved  with  celerity  into  the  gap,  and 
Grose,  Johnson's  reserve,- replaced  him.  Hazen  arrived  none 
too  soon.  His  lines  were  hardly  established  before  Long- 
street's  right  was  upon  him.  lapping  over  upon  Reynold's 
front,  and  then,  from  Reynolds  to  Steedman,  there  was  one 
continuing  hell  of  battle.  Garfield,  who  had  come  up  with 
an  escort,  having  ridden  from  Rossville,  after  reporting  to 
Thomas,  moved  along  the  ranks  of  his  old  brigade  (Harker, 
of  Wood),  encouraging  the  men,  and  giving  evidence  against 
all  loiterers  at  the  gaps  in  the  rear  that  every  officer  and 
man  of  them  could  easily  have  reached  the  field. 

Longstreet's  columns  assault  at  every  point,  as  rapidly  as 
his  lines  rolled  back  from  the  crest  could  be  reformed.  He 
had  ten  brigades  in  front  of  Brannan  and  Steedman,  while 
these  officers  had  only  four  unbroken  in  organization,  and 
fragments  of  two  others.  One  brigade  of  Preston,  which 
assaulted  Wood  and  Hazen's  line,  had  over  2,000  men  in  the 
movement.  The  successive  movements,  rather  the  tremen 
dous  dashes  of  these  lines  against  the  hill,  was  like  the  ad 
vance  of  breakers  with  which  ocean  storms  attack  the  shore. 
But,  as  surely,  each  wave  with  its  crest  of  steel,  its  spray  of 
smoke,  and  its  glitter  of  fire  broke  and  swept  back  with  dead 
and  wounded  in  its  terrible  undertow.  It  was  treason,  but 
magnificent.  Such  was  the  scene  which  these  soldiers  of 
Thomas  saw  on  the  Snodgrass  Hill  throughout  the  afternoon 
till  dusk. 

To  relieve  the  left  Polk  was  ordered  at  3  o'clock,  to  attack 
in  force  with  the  whole  right  wing.  But  it  required  much 
time  to  organize  those  battered  lines  for  assault,  but  when 
done,  it  was,  indeed,  formidable.  The  second  map  will  make 
it  plain.  Cleburne,  with  four  brigades,  was  deployed  before* 
Palmer  and  Johnson.  Jackson  and  Polk's  brigades  lapped 
over  Baird.  Cheatham  was  in  a  second  line.  The  map  gives 
his  position  wrongly,  though  it  is  taken  from  the  original 
official  map  in  the  War  Department.  Ranged  further  to  the 
right,  and  crossing  the  State  and  Lafayette  road  at  Mc- 
Daniel's,  and  thus  massed  against  the  Union  left,  were  the 
divisions  of  Breckinridge  and  Liddell,  Armstrong's  dis 
mounted  cavalry  division  of  Forrest,  and  Forrest's  artillery. 


47 

While  Grose,  of  Preston,  was  assaulting  Hazen  and  Wood 
this  attack  on  the  Union  leit  began.  But,  as 'before,  the 
brigades  that  moved  up  to  the  log  breastworks  were  speedily 
shattered,  though  this  time  they  took  their  artillery  through 
the  thickets  with  them,  pushing  it  by  hand. 

Once  more,  as  the  assault  was  made  on  Baird's  left,  there 
came  a  Union  charge  across  the  Kelly  field,  the  fourth  for 
the  day.  This  time  it  was  Willich,  the  reserve  of  Johnson. 
Withdrawing  from  lineand  facmgnorth,  hesweptalong  on  the 
run  and  with  cheers.  His  lines  dashed  into  the  woods  at  the 
point  where  Stanley  and  Grose  had  charged  before,  and  with 
out  a  halt  sprang  into  the  faces  of  the  advancing  Confederates. 
King's  regulars  and  Barnes  gave  brave  help,  and  once  more 
the  immediate  left  was  cleared.  The  force  on  the  road  by  the 
McDaniel  house,  though  unbroken,  was  not  advanced.  Later, 
an  assault  on  Reynolds  and  Palmer  was  ordered,  but,  naturally, 
it  was  feeble  after  so  many  repulses  at  the  breastworks.  At 
half-past  5  there  was  quiet  again  along  the  Union  left. 
Longstreet,  however,  in  front  of  the  right,  was  active  for 
another  hour,  though  at  every  point  unsuccessful. 

At  half-after  5  General  Thomas,  having  full  discretion, 
decided  to  withdraw  to  occupy  the  passes  in  his  rear  at  Mc- 
Farland  and  Kossville,  which  controlled  the  roads  to  Chat 
tanooga.  His  line  was  solid  at  every  point.  Both  wings  of 
the  Confederates  were  at  bay.  Their  right  was  too  much  broken 
to  successfully  assault  the  Union  left.  The  Union  right,  though 
its  ammunition  ran  low,  and  its  officers  were  constantly 
searching  the  boxes  of  the  killed  and  wounded  for  cartridges, 
was  becoming  practiced  in  the  use  of  the  bayonet  against  as 
saulting  lines,  and  in  spite  of  the  persistence  of  Longstreet's 
men,  had  begun  to  feel  comfortable  in  its  position.  The 
whole  line  could  have  been  held  until  night.  But  daylight 
was  wanted  to  set  the  army  in  orderly  motion  toward  the 
gaps  which  controlled  the  city.  After  that  was  accomplished 
the  darkness  afforded  the  needed  cover  to  complete  the  move 
ment.  It  was  because  Chattanooga,  and  not  the  Chicka- 
mauga  woods,  was  the  objective  of  the  campaign  that  the 
army  withdrew  to  Bossville.  It  was  in  no  sense  a  military 
retreat. 

If  Thomas  had  not  occupied  these  passes  in  the  night, 
Bragg  could  have  done  so,  and  the  object  he  had  in  view 
would  then  have  been  accomplished.  Had  Thomas  allowed 
it,  Bragg  would  have  been  only  too  glad  to  have  withdrawn 
from  the  field  and  "retreated"  on  Rossville.  Thomas  did 
not  permit  it,  but  went  there  first,  and  Chattanooga  was  won. 

The  withdrawal  involved  some  fighting.  The  movement 
began  on  the  right  of  Reynolds.  Palmer,  Johnson,  and 


48 

Baird  were  to  follow  in  succession,  all  leaving  their  skirmish 
ers  in  their  works. 

Reynolds  formed  his  brigades  by  the  flank  on  each  side  of 
the  Lafayette  road,  King  on  the  right  and  Turchin  on  the 
left.  Thus  he  advanced  northward  along  tjie  Kelly  field 
toward  Rossville.  General  Thomas  followed  at  the  head  of 
the  column.  As  they  passed  a  short  distance  beyond  the 
south  line  of  the  field  they  encountered  the  advancing  troops 
which  had  taken  part  in  the  last  rebel  attack.  Instantly 
Thomas  ordered  Reynolds  to  cause  Turchin  to  file  to  the 
left,  and  after  thus  changing  front  to  "charge  and  clear 
them  out."  The  line  of  Turchin's  charge  is  shown  on  the 
map.  Filing  into  the  wood  to  the  left  at  double-quick,  he 
faced  to  the  front  while  thus  moving,  and  his  lines  darted  at 
a  run  into  the  faces  of  the  enemy.  It  was  one  of  the  bravest 
and  most  brilliant,  most  important  and  effective  charges  of 
the  day — the  fifth  over  those  Kelly  fields.  At  the  same 
moment  King,  forcing  his  way  along  the  road,  fell  on  the 
flank  of  Liddell's  division  and  broke  it.  Dan  McCook,  who 
had  been  active  during  the  day  on  the  flank  of  Forrest,  ad 
vanced  and  opened  with  his  artillery  on  the  rebel  rear,  and 
after  short  but  sharp  fighting  the  formidable  array  was 
driven  back  and  the  way  to  Rossville  was  open. 

Turchin  and  King  moved  by  the  roads  to  McFarland's  Gap. 
Baird,  Johnson,  and  Palmer  followed  over  the  same  roads. 
They  were  attacked  as  they  left  their  works  and  crossed  the 
Kelly  field,  but  order  in  their  columns  was  restored  as  soon 
as  they  gained  the  shelter  of  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the 
road.  Hazen  and  Wood  then  followed  without  molestation. 
Steedman  withdrew  at  six  o'clock  from  the  extreme  right, 
and  Brannan  was  left  alone  on  Horseshoe  Ridge.  The  sun 
was  down.  The  shadows  were  thickening  in  the  woods  be 
fore  him,  and  yet  Longstreet's  men  remained  on  the  slopes, 
and  several  times  appeared  in  detachments  close  along  his 
lines.  Suddenly  a  line  of  Hindman's  men  were  found  on 
the  slope  where  Steedman  had  been.  By  some  strange  over 
sight  Brannan  had  not  been  notified  that  his  right  was  un 
protected.  A  hasty  examination  in  the  gathering  dusk 
showed  another  rebel  line  on  the  slope  directly  in  the  rear, 
and  which  had  come  round  through  the  gap  where  Steed- 
man's  right  had  been,  and  was  evidently  forming  for  an 
assault.  The  Thirty- fifth  Ohio,  of  Van  Derveer's  brigade, 
was  thrown  back  to  face  both  these  lines.  Fragments  of 
five  regiments  more,  which  had  opportunely  arrived,  were 
given  to  the  commander  of  the  Thirty-fifth.  His  own  regi 
ment  had  one  round  and  one  in  the  guns.  This  was  placed 
in  front.  The  others,  with  fixed  bayonets,  were  formed  in 


49 

the  rear.  Just  before  dark  a  rebel  officer  rode  in  on  the 
line  and  asked  what  troops  were  here.  He  was  shot  by  the 
near  outposts. 

Then  came  a  scattering  fire  from  the  flank  of  the  rebel  line 
along  the  ridge,  next  a  volley  from  the  Thirty-fifth,  and  a 
silent  awaiting  results  behind  its  line  of  bayonets.  The  vol 
ley  had  scattered  the  enemy  on  the  ridge,  and  the  force  in  the 
rear  had  withdrawn.  These  were  the  last  shots  on  the  right. 
Following  them  there  was  absolute  quiet  everywhere  on  the 
field.  The  stillness  was  painful  and  awful.  Brannan's  officers 
and  men,  peering  down  into  the  dim  and  smoking  ravine, 
saw  long  lines  of  fire  creeping  over  the  leaves,  and  in  and  out 
among  the  wounded  and  the  dead.  It  was  a  sight  far  more 
horrible  than  any  of  the  pictured  presentations  of  Dante's 
Inferno.  From  this  scene,  with  the  low  wailings  of  the  suf 
ferers  in  their  ears,  they  turned  in  triumph  and  exultant  to 
form  the  rear  guard  of  Thomas's  advance  to  Rossville.  Tur- 
chin  and  Willich  fought  last  on  the  left  and  formed  the  rear 
guard  there  ;  Van  Derveer  covered  the  right.  And  thus  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  midnight  occupied  the  passes 
which  made  the  possession  of  Chattanooga  secure. 

There  had  been  no  such  disordered  rush  of  the  broken  por 
tions  of  the  army  on  Chattanooga  as  the  panic-stricken  cor 
respondent  of  an  Eastern  paper  depicted,  who  gave  visions 
of  his  own  early  flight  to  the  country  as  news.  Only  a  small 
part  of  the  broken  wing  drifted  to  Chattanooga,.  From  7,000 
to  10,000  stopped  at  Kossville,  and  were  fairly  organized 
there.  When  Thomas's  forces  arrived  the  whole  army  was 
placed  in  position  on  Missionary  Ridge,  and  in  front  of  it,  and 
remained  in  line  of  battle  throughout  the  whole  of  the  21st. 

At  nightfall  the  army  advanced  to  Chattanooga — advanced 
is  the  word  ;  the  term  "  retreated,"  so  persistently  used  in 
regard  to  this  movement  has  no  place  in  the  truthful  history 
of  this  campaign.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  on  its 
way  to  Chattanooga,  the  city  it  set  out  to  capture.  It  had 
halted  at  Chickamauga,  on  its  line  of  advance,  to  fight  for  its 
objective.  On  the  night  of  the  21st  it  began  its  last  march 
for  the  city.  Every  foot  of  it  was  a  march  in  advance,  and 
not  retreat.  At  sunrise  of  the  22d  Brannan's  division,  which 
was  the  rear  guard,  reached  the  city,  and  the  campaign  for 
Chattanooga  was  at  an  end.  Until  that  morning  broke  the 
great  bulk  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  never  seen 
the  place. 

Thus,  crowned  with  success,  though  won  at  terrible  cost, 
closed  the  last  campaign  of  General  Rosecrans.  It  was 
matchless  in  its  strategy,  unequaled  in  the  skill  and  energy 
with  which  his  outnumbered  army  was  concentrated  for  bat- 


50 

tie.  Its  stubborn,  desperate,  and  heroic  fighting  throughout 
the  two  days'  battle  was  not  surpassed,  and,  judged  by  its 
returns  of  dead  and  wounded,  not  equaled  in  any  one  of  the 
great  battles  of  the  war.  It  secured  the  city  which  it  marched 
to  capture.  The  loss  was  no  greater  than  the  country  would 
have  expected  at  any  time  in  attaining  that  result.  If  Rose- 
crans  had  crossed  the  river  in  front  of  the  city  and  captured 
it  with  even  greater  loss,  the  country  would  have  gone  wild 
with  enthusiasm.  Had  he  been  properly  supported  from 
Washington  he  would  have  entered  it  without  a  battle,  since, 
if  there  had  been  even  a  show  of  activity  elsewhere,  Bragg' s 
army  would  not  have  been  nearly  doubled  with  re-enforce 
ments  and  thus  enabled  to  march  back  on  Chattanooga  after 
its  retreat  from  the  city;  The  reverse  on  the  field  on  Sunday 
was  not  the  disaster  which  at  the  time  it  was  declared  to  be, 
and  which  it  has  ever  since  suited  several  writers  of  military 
fiction  to  persistently  represent.  The  account  herewith  pre 
sented  shows  that  after  General  Thomas  consolidated  his  lines 
at  1  o'clock  on  Sunday  not  a  single  position  was  carried  and 
held  by  the  enemy.  The  withdrawal,  which  begun  soon  after 
5  o'clock,  was  not  in  any  sense  forced.  There  is  not  an  offi 
cer  or  soldier  who  fought  on  those  lines  but  knows  that  they 
could  have  been  held  throughout  till  dark. 

The  accepted  version  of  Sunday's  break  on  Rosecrans's 
right  is  that  the  two  corps  of  Crittenden  and  McCook  were 
swept  off  the  field  ;  but  only  five  brigades  of  McCook's 
entire  corps  left  the  field,  and  the  fragments  which  went  from 
Crittenden  would  not  exceed  two  brigades.  Palmer's  and 
Johnson's  divisions,  which  fought  splendidly  to  the  end 
under  Thomas  on  the  left,  were  respectively  from  Critten- 
den's  and  McCook's  corps.  Wood  belonged  to  Crittenden. 
Barnes's  brigade,  which  fought  on  the  extreme  left,  and  part 
of  Dick's  and  Samuel  Beatty's  were  all  of  Van  Cleve's  divi 
sion  of  Crittenden' s  corps.  In  other  words,  the  large  part 
of  Crittenden's  force  fought  to  the  last.  Four  regiments  of 
Wilder's  brigade  of  Reynolds's  division  were  detached  and 
cut  off  with  the  right,  and  a  considerable  part  of  Negley's 
division  of  Thomas  went  to  the  rear,  chiefly  through  the  bad 
conduct  of  its  commander.  We  have  seen,  however,  how 
persistently  and  effectively  Stanley's  and  John  Beatty's 
brigades  of  that  division  fought,  and  Beatty  and  General 
Charles  Grosvenor  and  Sirweli  and  Stoughton,  of  these 
brigades,  were  all  found  fighting  like  private  soldiers  on  the 
hill  with  Wood  and  Brannan  to  the  last.  The  battle  of 
Sunday  was,  then,  not  the  fight  of  any  one  corps,  but  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  There  was  no  disorderly  retreat 
of  the  army  on  Chattanooga,  and  nothing  approaching  it. 


51 

The  greater  portion  of  the  right  wing,  which  was  cut  off  and 
certainly  thrown  into  much  confusion,  was  reorganized  at 
Rossville,  and  occupied  its  place  in  line  at  that  point  through 
out  the  next  day  and  until  the  army  moved  on  in  the  night 
to  occupy  Chattanooga.  The  battle  was  desperate  from  the 
moment  it  opened  till  its  close.  For  the  most  part  the  lines 
fought  at  close  range  and,  in  the  countless  assaults,  often 
hand  to  hand.  On  the  first  day  there  were  no  field  works  of 
any  kind.  On  the  second  Thomas  was  protected  by  such  rude 
log  works  as  could  be  hastily  thrown  together.  Brannan  and 
Steedman  were  without  a  semblance  of  works.  Thebattle  in  the 
main,  on  both  sides,  was  dogged,  stand-up  fighting  far  within 
the  limit  of  point  blank  range.  For  the  second  day,  on  the 
Confederate  side,  the  contest  was  one  continued  series  of 
brave  and  magnificent  assaults. 

General  Rosecrans  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  with  an 
effective  force  of  all  arms  equipped  for  duty  of  a  few  hundred 
more  than  60,000.  Of  this  number  Wagner's  brigade,  with 
2,061  effectives,  held  Chattanooga,  leaving  the  Union  force 
in  front  of  Bragg  slightly  less  than  58,000.  It  was  several 
thousand  less  at  the  battle,  Post's  brigade  of  Davis'  division 
and  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  one  battery  being  en 
gaged  in  guarding  supply  trains. 

In  a  letter  from  General  Lee  to  President  Davis,  dated 
September  14,  1863,  the  following  figures  of  Bragg's  actual 
and  prospective  strength  are  thus  stated : 

"If  the  report  sent  to  me  by  General  Cooper  since  my 
return  from  Richmond  is  correct,  General  Bragg  had,  on  the 
20th  of  August  last,  51,101  effective  men  ;  General  Buckner, 
16,118.  He  was  to  receive  from  General  Johnson  9,000. 
His  total  force  will,  therefore,  be  76,219,  as  large  a  number 
as  I  presume  he  can  operate  with.  This  is  independent  of 
the  local  troops,  which,  you  may  recollect,  he  reported  as 
exceeding  his  expectations." 

It  will  be  well  to  remember,  in  connection  with  these  offi 
cial  figures,  that  Bragg,  after  the  battle,  reported  Long- 
street's  force,  which  was  not  included  by  Lee,  at  5,000. 
This,  according  to  the  figures  furnished  General  Lee,  gave 
Bragg  81,219.  According  to  General  Johnson's  corre 
spondence,  after  he  had  sent  9,000  to  Bragg,  he  subse 
quently  dispatched  him  two  small  brigades,  and  these,  later, 
reached  him  the  day  before  the  battle. 

A  reference  to  the  losses  on  each  side  will  show  that  there 
has  been  no  exaggeration  in  the  description  of  the  fighting. 
Rosecrans's  loss  was  16,179.  This  included  4,774  missing, 
of  which  a  large  number  were  killed  or  wounded.  Bragg's 
losses,  as  compiled  and  estimated  at  the  War  Records  Office, 


52 

were  17,804.  Thus  the  entire  loss  for  each  army  was  over 
twenty-five  per  cent,  of  the  entire  force  of  each.  Hill's 
corps  of  the  Confederate  right  wing  lost  2,990  out  of  a  total 
8,884.  Of  the  22,885  in  Longstreet's  left  wing  the  loss  was 
7,856,  with  one  brigade  heavily  engaged  not  reported. 
Longstreet's  loss  on  Sunday  afternoon  was  thirty-six  per 
cent,  of  those  engaged. 

The  casualties  in  Jackson's  brigade  of  Cleburne's  division, 
which  assaulted  on  Baird's  front,,  was  35  per  cent.,  while  the 
Fifth  Georgia,  of  that  brigade,  lost  55  per  cent.,  and  the 
First  Confederate  Regulars  43  per  cent.  Gregg's  brigade, 
of  Buckner's  corps,  lost  652  out  of  1,425.  Helm's  Ken 
tucky  brigade,  on  the  Union  left,  lost  75  per  cent,  of  its 
strength.  Bate's  brigade  lost  7  officers  killed  and  61  officers 
wounded,  and  the  total  casualties  were  607  out  of  1,316. 
All  his  field  officers  except  three  were  killed  or  wounded. 
The  losses  in  Govan's  brigade,  of  Walker's  corps,  exceeded 
50  per  cent.  Deas,  who  fought  in  front  of  Steedman's  as 
sault,  lost  745  out  of  1,942.  Walthall,  of  Walker,  lost  705 
out  of  1,727.  On  the  Union  side  Steedman  in  four  hours  lost 
1,787  out  of  3,700,  and  all  were  killed  and  wounded  but  one. 
Brannan's  division  had  5,998  engaged.  Its  casualties  were 
2,174,  or  38  per  cent.  The  loss  in  Van  Derveer's  brigade, 
of  this  division,  in  four  regiments  and  one  battery,  was  840 
out  of  1,788  engaged,  or  49  per  cent.  Croxton's  brigade,  of 
the  same  division,  made  up  of  five  regiments,  lost  938.  Of 
Van  Derveer's  regiments  the  Ninth  Ohio  lost  50  per  cent.  ; 
the  Thirty-fifth  Ohio,  a  small  fraction  less  than  50  per  cent. ; 
the  Second  Minnesota  192,  or  exactly  50  per  cent.,  and  the 
Eighty-seventh  Indiana  about  half  of  its  number.  General 
Wood  lost  1,070  in  two  brigades. 

These  figures  become  the  more  significant  when  compared 
with  the  statement  of  losses  in  the  world's  noted  battles. 
General  Wheeler,  the  distinguished  Confederate  cavalry  com 
mander,  thus  vividly  presented  this  question  at  the  gathering 
of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and  Confeder 
ates,  at  Chattanooga,  in  1881  : 

"  Waterloo  was  one  of  the  most  desperate  and  bloody  fields 
chronicled  in  European  history  and  yet  Wellington's  casual 
ties  were  less  than  12  per  cent.,  his  losses  being  2,432 
killed  and  9,528  wounded  out  of  90,000  men,  while  at  Shiloh, 
the  first  great  battle  in  which  General  Grant  was  engaged, 
one  side  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  9, 740 out  of  34,000,  while 
their  opponents  reported  their  killed  and  wounded  at  9,616, 
making  the  casualties  about  30  per  cent.  At  the  great  battle 
of  Wagram  Napoleon  lost  but  about  5  per  cent.  At  Wurz- 
burg  the  French  lost  but  3^  per  cent.,  and  yet  the  army  gave 


53 

up  the  field  and  retreated  to  the  Rhine.  At  Racour  Marshal 
Saxe  lost  but  2J  per  cent.  At  Zurich  Massena  lost  but  8 
per  cent.  At  Lagriz  Frederick  lost  but  6^  per  cent.  At 
Malplaqnet  Marlborough  lost  but  10  per  cent.,  and  at  Ra- 
millies  the  same  intrepid  commander  lost  but  6  per  cent.  At 
Contras  Henry  of  Navarra  was  reported  as  cut  to  pieces,  yet 
his  loss  was  less  than  10  per  cent.  At  Lodi  Napoleon  lost 
1^  per  cent.  At  Valmy  Frederick  lost  but  3  per  cent.,  and 
at  the  great  battles  of  Marengo  and  Austerlitz,  sanguinary 
as  they  were,  Napoleon  lost  an  average  of  less  than  14J  per 
cent.  At  Magenta  and  Solferino,  in  1859,  the  average  loss 
of  both  armies  was  less  than  9  per  cent.  At  Konigrattz,  in 
1866,  it  was  6  per  cent.  At  Werth,  Specheran,  Mars  la  Tour, 
Gravelotte,  and  Sedan,  in  1870,  the  average  loss  was  12  per 
cent.  At  Linden  General  Moreau  lost  but  4  per  cent.,  and 
the  Archduke  John  lost  but  7  per  cent,  in  killed  and  wounded. 
Americans  can  scarcely  call  this  a  lively  skirmish. 

"  At  Perry ville,  Murfreesboro,  Chickamauga,  Atlanta, 
Gettysburg,  Mission  Ridge,  the  Wilderness,  and  Spottsyl- 
vania  the  loss  frequently  reached  and  sometimes  exceeded 
forty  per  cent.,  and  the  average  of  killed  and  wounded  on 
one  side  or  the  other  was  over  thirty  per  cent." 

Those  who  remained  at  Chickamauga  and  fought  till  the 
night  of  Sunday  came,  when,  for  many  regiments,  every 
other  comrade  was  dead  or  wounded,  were  satisfied  with  the 
result,  and  have  always  maintained  that  Chickamauga  was 
fought  for  Chattanooga,  and  have  so  regarded  it  as  a  great 
and  notable  victory.  General  D.  H.  Hill  in  a  recent  Century 
article  thus  sums  up  the  result  for  the  Confederate  side  :  "  A 
breathing  space  was  allowed  him  ;  the  panic  among  his 
troops  subsided,  and  Chattanooga — the  objective  point  of  the 
campaign — was  held.  There  was  no  more  splendid  fighting 
in  '61,  when  the  flower  of  the  Southern  youth  was  in  the 
field,  than  was  displayed  in  those  bloody  days  of  September, 
'63.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  elan  of  the  Southern 
soldier  was  never  seen  after  Chickamauga — that  brilliant 
dash  which  had  distinguished  him  on  a  hundred  fields  was 
gone  forever.  He  was  too  intelligent  not  to  know  that  the 
cutting  in  two  of  Georgia  meant  death  to  all  his  hopes.  He 
knew  that  Longstreet's  absence  was  imperiling  Lee's  safety, 
and  that  what  had  to  be  done  must  be  done  quickly.  The 
delay  to  strike  was  exasperating  to  him  ;  the  failure  to  strike 
after  the  success  was  crushing  to  all  his  longings  for  an  in 
dependent  South.  He  fought  stoutly  to  the  last,  but  after 
Chickamauga,  with  the  sullenness  of  despair  and  without  the 
enthusiam  of  hope.  That  <  barren  victory  '  sealed  the  fate 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy." 


54 

The  authorities  at  Washington,  to  cover  their  own  short 
comings  and  inexcusable  neglect,  chose  to  deepen  the  erro 
neous  impression  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been 
routed  and  driven  back  to  Chattanooga  in  confusion.  The 
removal  of  General  Rosecrans  was  determined  upon.  In  fact, 
it  had  been  only  a  question  of  opportunity  since  the  cam 
paign  opened.  There  was  only  needed  the  misrepresenta 
tions  about  Chickamauga  to  furnish  this. 

In  the  mean  time  General  Rosecrans  thoroughly  fortified 
Chattanooga  and  was  actually  engaged  in  preparations  to 
open  the  river  for  supplies,  exactly  as  it  was  afterwards  done, 
when  he  was  removed.  In  fact,  his  plan  was  partially  per 
fected  before  he  crossed  the  river,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
he  made  written  contracts  with  Northern  firms  to  have  bridges 
completed  by  October  1  for  the  Tennessee  at  Bridgeport,  and 
the  Running  Water  at  Wauhatchie.  He  had  ordered  the 
thorough  reconnoitering  of  the  river  bank  opposite  the  north 
end  of  Missionary  Ridge — where  Sherman  afterward  crossed 
with  a  view  of  a  flank  attack  there.  It  was,  therefore,  al 
together  fitting  and  proper  that  the  order  for  his  relief  should 
arrive  while  he  was  absent  making  a  personal  examination  of 
the  vicinity  of  Brown's  Ferry,  where  he  intended  to  throw  a 
bridge  to  unite  with  Hooker  from  Bridgeport  and  open  the 
river  exactly  as  was  afterward  done.  He  had  even  notified 
Harker  of  the  plan  three  days  before  and  ordered  him  to  be 
ready  to  execute  his  part  of  it.  General  Thomas,  at  first, 
insisted  that  he  would  resign  rather  than  appear  to  acquiesce 
in  Rosecrans's  removal  by  accepting  the  command.  It  was 
at  Rosecrans's  earnest  solicitation  that  he  reconsidered  this 
determination.  But  he  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  order 
was  cruelly  unjust.  When  General  Garfield  left  for  Wash 
ington  soon  after  the  battle  he  immediately  charged  him  to 
do  all  he  could  to  have  Rosecrans  righted.  These  will  be 
new  statements  to  most,  but  they  are  true. 

The  survivors  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  should  awake 
to  great  pride  in  this  notable  field  of  Chickamauga.  Why 
should  it  not,  as  well  as  Eastern  fields,  be  marked  by  monu 
ments,  and  its  lines  accurately  preserved  for  history?  There 
was  no  more  magnificent  fighting  during  the  war  than  both 
armies  did  there.  Both  sides  might  well  unite  in  preserving 
the  field  where  both,  in  a  military  sense,  won  such  renown. 

H.  V.  B. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
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AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

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THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
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DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


JUN     2   1947 

-doN   2    to# 

MAY    3  1980 

7   V&i 

al  I\V           i       **^ 

REC.  tin-     WW 

1 

LD  21-100m-12,  '43  (8796s) 

Gaylord  Bros..  Inc. 

Stockton,  Calif. 
T.M.  Reg.  U.S.  Pat.  Off. 


YC  51071 


M144778 


3-7 


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